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Abstract
This thesis studies the eﬀect of performance pay on eﬀort, selection and matching as-
sortativeness in academia, using the introduction of performance pay in German academia
as a natural experiment and employing a newly constructed data set encompassing the
aﬃliations and productivity of the universe of academics in the country.
I estimate the pure eﬀort eﬀect in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework comparing the
productivity of cohorts that started their ﬁrst tenured position just before the reform,
and consequently do not receive performance pay, with those starting their ﬁrst tenured
position after the reform, and therefore do receive performance pay. I ﬁnd that the eﬀort
eﬀect is economically large; amounting to a 35% increase in academic productivity relative
to the pre-reform productivity in the control group.
I estimate the selection eﬀect by analysing the rate at which academics of diﬀerent
productivity levels switch to the performance pay scheme and by exploiting the fact that the
old and new wage scheme compare diﬀerently for academics at diﬀerent ages, which gives
rise to selection incentives that are inversely related to age. I ﬁnd that more productive
academics are more likely to select into performance pay, and that this eﬀect is stronger
for younger academics.
The empirical framework to study matching assortativeness is informed by a simple
matching model in which I show that performance pay increases positive assortative match-
ing if there are positive productivity spillovers, and that this increase is larger if comple-
mentarities are stronger. I test this hypothesis in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework
using a measure of complementarity strength as a continuous treatment variable and ﬁnd
that assortative matching increases more in ﬁelds with stronger complementarities, thus
providing empirical evidence that performance related pay increases positive assortative
matching. This eﬀect is large; amounting to a two- to threefold increase in positive assor-
tative matching.
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1 Introduction
Academia constitutes an important economic sector, representing both a large direct eco-
nomic value and sizeable exports. In the UK, for instance, the sector amounts to an
estimated direct value of 59 billion Euros and accounts for around 4.5 billion Euros in
exports (McCormack et al. 2014). Furthermore, universities are important producers of
research, particularly basic research, accounting for about 50% of basic research in the
United States in the late 90's (Lach and Schankerman 2008 citing NationalScienceBoard
2000). Academic research, in turn, has been shown to have signiﬁcant local spillover
eﬀects (Kantor and Whalley 2014, Agrawal 2001), as well as increase total factor produc-
tivity growth (Adams 1990). It is therefore important to understand what determines the
performance of universities.
Human capital is the primary input factor in academia, so human resource manage-
ment should have ﬁrst order eﬀects in the sector. Studying the eﬀects of human resource
management on the performance of universities is therefore both relevant for the debate
about university governance, and for our understanding of the eﬀects of human resource
management systems in the workplace at large. Accordingly, a number of studies have
analysed the eﬀect of various aspects of human resource management on university pro-
ductivity, from practices in general (McCormack et al. 2014), to more speciﬁc aspects such
as incentives in the form of inventor royalty shares (Lach and Schankerman 2008, 2004).
Aghion et al. (2010) take a step back, to factors inﬂuencing university governance, and
study how the level of autonomy that a university enjoys and the amount of competition
it faces aﬀects its productivity.
This thesis focuses on one particular aspect of human resource management; pay, specif-
ically performance pay. Performance pay is both widespread and becoming ever more
prevalent. Lemieux et al. (2009) for instance show, using PSID data, that the incidence
of performance pay for US salaried workers increased from less than 45% in the '70's to
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more than 60% in the '90's. Incentive systems have been widely studied (see e.g. Lazear
and Oyer 2012, Bloom and Reenen 2011, Oyer and Schaefer 2011, Lazear and Shaw 2007,
for excellent reviews of the literature), and many studies have reported positive eﬀects of
performance pay on productivity through increased eﬀort (cf. Hossain and List 2012, Mu-
ralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Boly 2011, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Carpenter et al.
2010, Bellemare et al. 2010, Lavy 2009, Bandiera et al. 2005, Shearer 2004, Lazear 2000a).
The ﬁrst question this thesis aims to answer is whether performance pay has a positive
eﬀort eﬀect in academia as well.
Because academics might be particularly intrinsically motivated (McCormack et al.
2014), and because this intrinsic motivation might be crowded out by extrinsic incen-
tives (Dickinson and Villeval 2008, Besley and Ghatak 2005), it is not ex ante obvious that
performance pay increases eﬀort in academics. The eﬀect of performance pay on teachers'
eﬀort has, for instance, both been found to be positive and signiﬁcant (Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2011) and insigniﬁcant (Glewwe et al. 2010). Lach and Schankerman (2008)
and (2004) ﬁnd that higher inventor royalty shares are associated with larger licensing rev-
enues using university level data. The ﬁrst part of this thesis adds to our understanding of
incentives in universities by showing that performance pay increases the eﬀort of academics
in basic research, using individual level data.
As a next step, I study what kind of academics are attracted to performance pay. Lazear
(2000a) ﬁnds that windshield installers who are more productive prefer piece-rate pay over a
ﬂat wage and consequently self-select into the former scheme and Dohmen and Falk (2011)
present evidence of a similar selection eﬀect in the lab. Leuven et al. (2011) show that
higher ability students are more likely to select into tournaments in which they can win a
larger prize. I ﬁnd that in academia too, more productive academics are more likely to self-
select into performance related pay. This is reassuring, since if lower productivity academics
would be more likely to self-select into performance pay, the overall eﬀect of performance
pay on productivity in academia might be negative, and higher-powered incentives would
not be a feasible means to increase academic output.
Finally, I study the eﬀect of performance pay on the organisation of academics. Kremer
(1993) shows that if there are complementarities in worker skill, workers match positive
assortatively by skill. In turn, this causes output and wages to increase sharply with skill,
and incomes to diﬀer vastly across countries. Furthermore, we know from Legros and New-
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man (2002) that if complementarities are such that the output function is supermodular
in skill, positive assortativeness increases total output. Since performance pay increases
the utility that a worker derives from his output, workers have a (weakly) greater incentive
to match positive assortatively by skill if there are complementarities in worker skill. If
this holds true for academia as well, performance pay should increase positive assortative
matching in academia too. This would increase total academic output if the academic
output function is supermodular. A more positively assortative matching of academics by
skill however also implies a less equal distribution of highly productive academics across
universities. Because academic research has been shown to have signiﬁcant local spillover
eﬀects through university-industry partnerships (Kantor and Whalley 2014, Agrawal 2001),
a more positive assortative matching of academics by skill and consequently a greater con-
centration of academic research in a few places, would mean a concentration of such local
spillovers in a limited number of areas. Furthermore, to the extent that academics who
are productive researchers are also gifted educators, a more positive assortative matching
would imply a less equal distribution of high quality tertiary education as well.
I use the introduction of a new performance pay scheme in German academia as a
natural experiment to study the eﬀect of performance pay on eﬀort, selection and matching
assortativeness in academia. This performance pay scheme was announced in 2002 and
implemented in 2005. Any professorial contract signed or renegotiated after the pay reform
necessarily falls under the performance pay scheme (Detmer and Preissler 2004). Before
the reform, academics were paid according to an age-related pay scheme in which pay
would increase every two years until the age of 49 (Hochschullehrerbund 2009). Under the
age-related pay scheme, pay is thus eﬀectively ﬂat. The performance pay scheme involves
a basic wage, which is lower than the wage under the age-related pay scheme for most
ages (Hochschullehrerbund 2009, Oeﬀentlicher-Dienst 2004). On top of this basic wage
however, professors can earn performance bonuses. Universities can award these bonuses
to attract or retain a professor, for on-the-job performance, and for taking on management
roles or tasks (BMBF 2002). Attraction or retention bonuses are generally awarded on
the basis of qualiﬁcations and past performance in research and education and can be
either temporary (at ﬁrst) or permanent (Detmer and Preissler 2004, 2005). At most
universities, the bonuses for on-the-job performance are distributed through, what are
eﬀectively, promotion tournaments, with promotion to a next hierarchy level associated
11
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with a pay rise (Lünstroth 2011, Kräkel 2006, Harbring et al. 2004). These bonuses are
awarded on the basis of performance in research and education as well and they too can be
permanent or temporary (Handel 2005). The on-the-job performance bonuses can range
from 90 Euros to 2500 Euros1 (Lünstroth 2011), while attraction or retention bonuses can
be even larger, since most state laws do not stipulate an upper bound (Handel 2005).
Accordingly, attraction bonuses account for the bulk of variable pay awarded under the
performance pay scheme, while the management bonuses account for the smallest fraction
(BMI 2007).
I constructed a new panel data set encompassing the personal details and information
regarding the academic aﬃliations and research productivity of the universe of academics
in Germany for the purposes of this research. The data set spans 15 years, from 1999
to 2013, and contains data on more than 55000 academics who, at some point in the 15
year timespan, held a tenured professorial position at a public university in Germany. It
is these academics that I focus on in the empirical analyses in this thesis, because only
tenured professors can earn bonuses under the performance pay scheme. I restrict attention
to public universities, because I focus on the research dimension of academic output, and
research output of higher education institutions other than universities is much smaller
than that of universities.
In order to study the eﬀort eﬀect, I use the fact that any professorial contract renegoti-
ated or signed after the implementation of the reform in 2005 falls under the performance
pay scheme. Academics who ﬁrst made tenure just before 2005 are thus paid according to
the age-related pay scheme, while those who made tenure just after the reform fall under
the performance pay scheme. If the timing of the tenure decision is exogenous we can
then identify the eﬀort eﬀect of performance pay by comparing the research output of the
academics who made tenure just after the reform with the productivity of academics who
made tenure just before. I therefore estimate the eﬀort eﬀect in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
framework, using the academics who made tenure right after the reform as treatment
group, and the academics who made tenure just before as control group. I ﬁnd that per-
formance pay increases productivity by 35%, about two-thirds of which can be ascribed to
the tournament component of the performance pay scheme and a third to the piece-rate
component of performance pay.
1In addition to monthly salary
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As a next step, I present the results of a number of tests of the identifying assump-
tions. I ﬁnd no evidence of pre-existing trends, which lends support to the identifying
parallel-trends assumption of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework. Furthermore, I ﬁnd
no evidence undermining the assumption that the timing of the tenure decision is exoge-
nous. A placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences for instance shows that there is no diﬀerential
change in productivity from before to after the reform between two cohorts of academics
who made tenure before the reform. If higher or lower productivity academics were able to
speed up their tenure clock, and if their productivity would change diﬀerentially once they
have tenured, this would show up as a positive or negative eﬀect of performance pay on
the productivity of the cohort making tenure just before the reform (the placebo treatment
group).
Apart from academics who make tenure after the reform and therefore necessarily fall
under the performance pay scheme, academics can also self-select into the performance
pay scheme. Academics who hold a tenured aﬃliation before the reform, and who are
consequently paid according to the age-related pay scheme, switch to the performance
pay scheme when they sign a new contract or renegotiate their existing one after the
reform. Because pay increases with age in the age-related pay scheme, I would expect
more productive academics to be more likely to switch to the performance pay scheme. I
perform hazard rate and survival function analyses to test this hypothesis and ﬁnd that
more productive academics are more likely to select into the performance pay scheme
indeed. Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger for younger professors. Since pay increases with
age in the age-related pay system, whereas the performance pay scheme pays a ﬁxed basic
wage, the performance pay scheme is relatively less attractive for older academics. Unless
they are suﬃciently productive so that their performance bonuses in the performance pay
scheme will (more than) make up for the diﬀerence in basic wages, older professors will
not self-select into the performance pay scheme.
Finally, I estimate the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness. If there are
complementarities in academic research, such that research output increases both in own
productivity and in the productivity of colleagues, and if academics derive utility from their
research output even in the age-related pay system, matching should be positively assor-
tative by productivity. That is, we would expect to see highly productive academics work
together in the same department, and similarly for low productivity academics. However, if
13
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academics also have idiosyncratic preferences, such as personal preferences and preferences
regarding geographic location, matching would not be perfectly positive assortative. Some
highly productive academics would then be aﬃliated with departments where the average
productivity of the faculty is lower, and vice versa. In this case, performance pay should in-
crease positive assortative matching by increasing the extent to which their utility depends
on their output, provided there are spillovers so that output increases in the productivity
of colleagues. Moreover, the increase in positive assortative matching should be larger if
complementarities are stronger. It is this latter hypothesis that I use to identify the ef-
fect of performance pay on matching assortativeness and test in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
framework using a measure of the strength of complementarities as a continuous treatment
variable.
A change in matching assortativeness implies a diﬀerent distribution of academics across
departments and hence a change in the composition of departments. I therefore study the
two channels through which the departmental composition can change - new hires and
academics leaving a department - to estimate the eﬀect of performance pay on matching
assortativeness in academia. If matching becomes more positively assortative after the
reform, the diﬀerence in the productivity of new hires from before to after the reform
should be larger for high quality departments. Furthermore, relatively lower productivity
academics should be leaving high quality departments after the reform. Both predictions
are borne out by the data and provide evidence that matching becomes more positively
assortative after the reform. Moreover, this increase is larger in ﬁelds in which complemen-
tarities are stronger, which is in line with performance pay increasing positive assortative
matching as driven by spillover eﬀects. I ﬁnd that the increase in positive assortative
matching is large; amounting to a two- to threefold increase. The eﬀect is driven by ju-
nior hires matching more positive assortatively, particularly so in high complementarity
ﬁelds. This result aligns with the ﬁndings in Waldinger (2012) and (2010) that early-career
academics experience the largest spillover eﬀects.
A test for pre-existing trends ﬁnds no evidence of diﬀerences in trends between high
quality and low quality departments in ﬁelds with diﬀerent levels of complementarities.
Furthermore, I test whether systematic diﬀerences in the hiring budget of high quality
departments in ﬁelds in which complementarities are stronger could explain the results.
In particular, if high quality departments in strong complementarity ﬁelds would have
14
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systematically larger hiring budgets, they could attract higher productivity academics by
oﬀering larger bonuses, and not because new hires beneﬁt more from having highly pro-
ductive colleagues under performance pay when spillovers are larger. Reassuringly, while
I do ﬁnd that a larger hiring budget enables departments to attract higher productivity
academics after the reform, this does not aﬀect the estimate of the eﬀect of performance
pay on matching assortativeness.
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 contains a description of the
institutional background, with details on the pay reform in German academia, as well as
the German academic system more generally. In Chapter 3, I provide details on the data
set I use and its construction. Chapter 4 contains the analysis of the eﬀort and selection
eﬀect of performance pay in academia, starting out with a theoretical framework, followed
by the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 concerns the eﬀect of performance pay on matching
assortativeness. Here too, I ﬁrst provide a theoretical model before moving on to the
empirical analyses. Chapter 6 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
2.1 The Academic Pay Reform
In February 2002 a law introducing a new professorial pay scheme comprising a basic
wage plus performance related bonuses was passed by Germany's parliament. States had
until 1 January 2005 to implement the reform within their respective jurisdiction - only
Bremen, Niedersachsen and Rheinland-Pfalz introduced it before this deadline (Detmer
and Preissler 2005). The new "W-pay" scheme replaced the old "C-pay" scheme in which
professorial salaries increased with age. The basic wage of the W-pay scheme is lower than
C-wages for all but the lowest ages (Hochschullehrerbund 2009, Oeﬀentlicher-Dienst 2004),
but the total pay under the W-scheme can exceed that under the C-scheme if an academic
is paid large performance bonuses. Any contract for a professorial position entered (or
renegotiated) after implementation of the reform falls under the W-pay scheme.
2.1.1 Performance Pay (W-Pay)
Under the new pay scheme, performance bonuses can be paid on three grounds: as wage
supplements to attract outside professors or prevent professors from wandering oﬀ; as on-
the-job bonuses for research or educational performance; and as supplements for professors
taking on management tasks or roles (BMBF 2002). The ﬁrst kind of bonus, the attraction
or retention bonus, is paid to attract a professor or prevent him from leaving. These bonuses
are generally awarded on the basis of a professor's qualiﬁcations and past achievements and
performance (Detmer and Preissler 2005). Attraction or retention bonuses can be awarded
permanently, but many states also allow for the option of awarding them for a ﬁxed term
(initially) or even as a one-oﬀ payment (Detmer and Preissler 2004, 2005). State laws
and university statutes generally do not stipulate a maximum for attraction or retention
bonuses.
16
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The second class of bonuses are bonuses paid for on-the-job performance, awarded for
accomplishments in research, teaching, art, mentoring and supervision (BMBF 2002). Re-
search performance for instance may be demonstrated through the number and kind of
publications, research prizes, patents and the award of external research funds, while e.g.
exceptional teaching evaluations can serve to demonstrate special teaching achievements
(Detmer and Preissler 2005).
Most universities pay the on-the-job bonuses for research and education through the
so-called Stufenmodell; a system of performance levels each of which is associated with
a bonus (Lünstroth 2011). Promotions to a higher level and the associated bonus are
not necessarily granted permanently - they can be granted for a limited time period and
renewed upon positive evaluation of performance. Most universities announce at the be-
ginning of a year either both the number of levels and associated bonus pay or just the
number of promotions to higher levels (in which case the associated bonus pay is generally
laid down in the university's statutes) to be awarded in that year (Lünstroth 2011). The
distribution of on-the-job bonuses through the Stufenmodell is therefore much like a pro-
motion tournament (Harbring et al. 2004, Kräkel 2006, Lünstroth 2011). Both the number
of levels and the associated pay varies greatly across universities; the number ranging from
2 (e.g. Augsburg and Erfurt University) to 10 (University of Trier), and the associated
pay from 90 (Technical University of Berlin) to 2500 Euros per month (e.g. Bielefeld and
Bremen Universities) (Lünstroth 2011).
Some universities pay on-the-job bonuses through a relative performance pay system
(Leistungspunkte Modell). In this system, academics get awarded points for achievements
in research and education and the university announces at the beginning of the year how
much money will be available for on the job performance pay that year. Each academic
then receives a share of the prize pot that is equal to his relative performance that year,
making this essentially a Japanese style (J-type) tournament (Kräkel 2003, Lünstroth
2011).
The third kind of bonus takes the form of supplements that can be paid to professors
for taking on management tasks or roles (BMBF 2002). These bonuses generally range
between 200 and 600 Euros (for the dean) per month and are paid for the duration of the
task or role only.
The reform also introduced the option for professors to be paid a supplement from third-
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party awarded funds for research or teaching projects for the duration of such projects
(BMBF 2002)1. Some states stipulate that these supplements should not amount to more
than the basic W-wage of the professor (Detmer and Preissler 2005).
Under the W-pay scheme, only tenured professors can be awarded bonuses - junior
professors can only be paid a (non-pensionable) supplement of 260 Euros per month upon
positive evaluation (Detmer and Preissler 2005)2. This is only a very small bonus compared
to the total amount of bonuses that tenured professors may be awarded, which can go up to
5241,48 Euros3, or even more in special circumstances4(BMBF 2002, Detmer and Preissler
2005). Importantly, universities have discretion on how to award bonuses 5.
The academic pay reform includes a cost-neutrality clause that stipulates that the av-
erage professorial pay at the federal ("Bund") and state ("Land") level remain at the re-
spective levels before the reform, so as to prevent the reform leading to either cost-cutting
or a cost explosion (Handel 2005). The law does allow for states to increase their target
level to, at most, the highest state average, as well as year-on-year increases of on average
2% (up to 10% in total) (BMBF 2002). Given that the base wage of the performance
pay system is lower than most of the salaries under the age-related pay system, the cost
neutrality requirement guarantees that the diﬀerence between C-salaries and W-base pay
is paid as bonuses under the W-pay scheme. Handel (2005) calculates that with a mean
professorial pay average of 71.000 Euros at universities, about 26% of this is available for
performance pay bonuses for university professors6. In many states, the state's ministry
of education implements the cost-neutrality requirement by calculating university-speciﬁc
professorial pay averages that are to be used as guideline professorial pay average at each
university (Handel 2005). The fact that on-the-job bonuses are distributed through, what
are essentially tournament schemes, where the number and amount of bonuses to be won
in a given year are announced at the beginning of a year suggests that the benchmark pro-
1These supplements were intended to motivate professors to take on activities as part of their academic
job that they may have otherwise performed on the side (Handel 2005)
2Plus, in special cases an extra supplement per month not exceeding 10% of the basic W1 wage (Detmer
and Preissler 2005)
3This limit is set at the diﬀerence between the basic wage of W3 and B10 (another, non-professorial pay
scheme), which was 5241.48 on 1 August 2004 (Detmer and Preissler 2005)
4If the academic already earns bonuses that exceed this limit and a higher bonus is necessary to attract
the academic to another German university or prevent him from wandering oﬀ to another German
university (BMBF 2002).
5See Handel (2005) for a comprehensive overview of how much discretion higher education institutes have
regarding hiring and pay decision after the reform in the diﬀerent German states.
6For this calculation, Handel (2005) uses 2001/2002 data and assumes that the ratio of W2 to W3
professors at universities will be about the same as that of C3 to C4, namely 46:54.
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fessorial pay average is reasonably binding each year (Harbring et al. 2004, Kräkel 2006,
Lünstroth 2011).
2.1.2 Age-Related Pay (C-Pay)
In the old, age-related pay scheme, the monthly salary of professors increases every two
years by roughly 170 Euros7, from the age of 21 to the age of 49 (Hochschullehrerbund
2009, Oeﬀentlicher-Dienst 2004, Expertenkommission 2000). In contrast, the basic wage in
the performance pay scheme does not vary with age, and the level is such that professors
earn a higher before-bonus wage in the performance pay scheme at ﬁrst, but once they get
older, they would earn a higher basic wage in the age-related pay system. Depending on
the speciﬁc pay level of an academic (C3, or C4 in the age-related system; W2 or W3 in
the performance pay system), the crossing point of the basic wage schedules occurs at age
33 or 43 (Oeﬀentlicher-Dienst 2004, Handel 2005).
Before the pay reform, professors in the highest pay level of the age-related pay scheme
(C4) could earn bonuses when they received oﬀers after their ﬁrst appointment as C4-
professor. These bonuses were standardised to be around 650 Euros for the second C4-
oﬀer, and about 730 Euros for the third C4-oﬀer from another university, and roughly 75%
of this if a counter-oﬀer of the home university was accepted (Detmer and Preissler 2006,
Preissler 2006, Dilger 2013). By comparison, the average attraction and retention bonus
in the W-pay system had already grown to 1187 Euros in 2006, and the average on-the-job
performance to 1649 Euros (BMI 2007). Furthermore, only a small fraction of professors
qualiﬁed for and received bonuses under the age-related pay system. Handel (2005) for
instance calculates, using data from the Ministry of Science and Culture in Niedersach-
sen, that only about 16.5% of professors received attraction or retention bonuses in the
age-related pay system. In contrast, any tenured professor in the performance pay system
can receive bonuses, and already in 2006 about 77% of professors in the performance pay
scheme did receive bonuses in the performance pay system (BMI 2007). Consequently,
only about 3.55% of the total professorial pay volume was spent on attraction and reten-
tion bonuses in the age-related system, before the reform (Handel 2005, using data from
Expertenkommission 2000), while an estimated 26% of the professorial pay volume was
available for performance bonuses under the performance pay scheme immediately after
7Using pay tables valid as of August 2004 (Hochschullehrerbund 2009)
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the reform(Handel 2005). Combined with the fact that, at most ages, the basic wage is
lower in the performance pay system than in the age-related system, this means that a
larger portion of professorial pay depends on performance and there is a greater spread in
professorial pay in the W-pay system. The W-pay system therefore oﬀers higher powered
performance incentives than the old, age-related pay system.
2.2 Professorships
In order to qualify for a professorship, aspiring academics have to complete a PhD, as
well as, traditionally, a post-doctoral qualiﬁcation (habilitation). The habilitation in-
volves working as part of the research group of a full professor, and is completed with a
postdoctoral thesis (Fitzenberger and Schulze 2014, Pritchard 2006). In 2002 the German
equivalent of assistant professorships (Juniorprofessur) was introduced to supersede the
habilitation (Pritchard 2006). Junior professorships can last up to six years and grant
aspiring academics more independence than the habilitation (Fitzenberger and Schulze
2014). There are two tenured professorial ranks in Germany; the ausserordentliche (or
a.o.) Professur, which is the equivalent of an associate professorship, and the ordentliche
(o.) Professur, which is the equivalent of a full professorship (Research and Academic Jobs
in Germany (2011)).
When a professorial position needs to be ﬁlled, an appointment commission is formed
consisting of faculty professors, students and academic staﬀ. The appointment commission
compiles a top-3 list of candidates that, in turn, needs to be approved by a departmen-
tal committee (also consisting of professors, students, academic and non-academic staﬀ).
Professors always make up the majority in such commissions. The top-3 list of candi-
dates is given to the state's ministry of higher education, which then decides which of the
candidates on the list to appoint (Lünstroth 2011).
2.3 Higher Education Institutions
There are currently 397 higher education institutions in Germany that are either public
or private but recognised by the state (Hochschulkompass 2014). The two main categories
of higher education institutions are the universities (Universitaeten) and the universities
of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). The former are more research oriented, the latter
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more vocationally oriented (Jongbloed 2009). There are currently 89 public universities in
Germany, and I will focus on these institutions in this thesis (Hochschulkompass 2014)8.
because the reform changes the pay schemes of academics at public higher education insti-
tutions only, and because German higher education institutions that are not universities,
such as the universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen), are much more applied
and faculty tends to publish much less (BMBF 2002). I would therefore not be able to
use publication records to derive meaningful measures of productivity of academics at the
latter institutions, and since I focus on the research output dimension of productivity, I
will not consider them in this study.
Public universities are publicly funded, with most of the public funds coming from the re-
spective state's ministry for higher education. Public subsidies make up around 80% of the
income of a university, while additional research grants comprise roughly 15%. Of the addi-
tional research money, about a third is provided by private institutions (Kaiser et al. 2002).
The public subsidies to universities have been traditionally subdivided in expenditure cat-
egories (line items) and personnel positions (described in the so-called Stellenplan), and
determined in large part based on previous year's subsidies with only incremental changes.
Any incremental changes to the budget would have to be negotiated with the state ministry.
Recently, states have started to move towards more indicator-based budgeting, though the
share of public funds allocated in this way is still small (up to 7%) (Jongbloed 2009).
Public universities are thus greatly dependent on the state for their personnel and other
expenditures and before the reform had little means or autonomy to pay professors a wage
other than the age-related wage dictated by the old pay system.
8This was the number of public universities as reported by Hochschulkompass (2014) on 31 August 2014.
The list of public universities that I consider for the empirical analysis is slightly diﬀerent, i.a. because
some institutions became universities only recently (e.g. the Hochschule Geisenheim University became
a university on 1 January 2013 and the Hochschule für Film und Fernsehen Potsdam only in July 2014
(Historie 1872 bis heute 2014, Filmuniversitaet 2014)).
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3 Data Description
For this project I constructed a new panel data set comprising the universe of German
academics for the years 1993-2013. This individual level panel comprises 55132 academics
who, at some point in the 15-year timespan, held a tenured position at a German public
university1. The data set contains the aﬃliation, position (title) and whether the position
is tenured in a given year, as well as the number of publications in that year, the number
of years a person has been active in academia and the average number of publications in
the preceding six years. Furthermore, the data set provides the year when postdoctoral
qualiﬁcations were obtained and the year a person started working in academia. Finally,
there is also some personal information such as gender, birth year and, if applicable, year
of passing.
For the purposes of this research, I focus on academics who held a tenured position
at a German public university between 1999 and 2013, because the reform changes the
pay schemes of academics at public higher education institutions only, and performance
bonuses can be earned in tenured positions only2. The reform was implemented for other
German higher education institutions, such as the universities of applied sciences, too
(BMBF 2002). However, as their name suggests, these institutions are much more applied
and faculty tends to publish much less. I would therefore not be able to use publication
records to derive meaningful measures of productivity of academics at these institutions,
and given that I focus on research output and use publication records as a measure of
this output, I do not consider higher education institutions other than universities in this
study.
To construct the individual panel data set I draw from three main input data sets:
1The individual level panel is actually much bigger. It also contains academics at non-tenured positions, at
other German institutions of higher education such as universities of applied science (Fachhochschulen
in German), German private universities and higher education institutions in Austria and Switzerland.
2The German equivalent of assistant professors, Juniorprofessoren (awarded a W1-salary), can earn a
very small yearly bonus only in the performance pay system.
22
CHAPTER 3. DATA DESCRIPTION
Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender, Forschung & Lehre Magazine and ISI Web of
Science. Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender (hereafter: DGK) is a comprehen-
sive encyclopedia of academics aﬃliated with German universities (Kuerschners Deutscher
Gelehrten Kalender Online 2013, Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender 2006, 2008).
I use it as a register of the universe of academics aﬃliated with German universities and
draw information regarding academics' personal information (full name, birth date, year of
passing, gender) as well as professional information (academic aﬃliation at given points in
time, start year of academic career in Germany, end year of academic career in Germany,
self-reported information on career history) from it.
From the Forschung & Lehre Magazine (hereafter: FuL) I draw information regarding
the timing of changes of aﬃliations and the obtainment of postdoctoral qualiﬁcations of
these academics (Forschung und Lehre 1999-2013). FuL groups this information in 12
broad categories that encompass the ﬁeld in which the respective academic is working. I
classify academics registered in DGK under these same categories and deﬁne departments
along the same lines. The FuL categories, and hence the departments that I distinguish,
are: theology; philosophy and history; social sciences; philology and cultural studies; law;
economics; mathematics, physics and computer science; biology, chemistry, earth sciences
and pharmaceutics; engineering; agricultural sciences, nutrition and veterinary medicine;
medicine (human); dentistry3.
Finally, I use the ISI Web of Science database to compile publication records of the
academics in my data set. Speciﬁcally, I draw the number of publications of an academic
in a given year from the ISI Web of Science database for the years 1993-2013. I then weigh
each publication by the two-year impact factor of the journal in which the publication
appears. The impact factors are taken from the ISI journal citation report (JCR) of the
year of publication4.
I can match 83% of academics who appeared as having a tenured aﬃliation with a
German university in FuL to academics listed in DGK on the basis of last name, initials
and ﬁeld. The 17% that I cannot match appears to be down to misspellings of names
and erroneous aﬃliation changes information in FuL. 50% of changes in aﬃliations5 are
3The department level panel consists of a total of 1068 departments, which amounts to an average of just
under 11 departments per university.
4I have ISI JCR data for the years 2000-2013 only. I therefore use the average of the impact factors from
JCR 2000 through JCR 2004 to weigh publications before 2000.
5Where at least one of the aﬃliations concerns a tenured position at a German university.
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described in FuL, providing direct information on the timing of the change. Of the other
half of changes, the year of change is given in the respective DGK record in 23% of the
cases6. I infer the timing of the remaining aﬃliation changes from aﬃliation records of an
academic at diﬀerent points in time, the year they obtained postdoctoral qualiﬁcations as
well as the start and end year of their academic career in Germany recorded in DGK. A
detailed description of the construction of the individual level panel can be found in later
sections in this chapter.
For the purposes of studying the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortative-
ness I derived a departmental level panel data set from the individual level data set. The
departmental level data set comprises the departments of each of the 89 German public
universities between 1999 and 2013. For each department, the panel contains the total
number of tenured professors in a given year, the number of new hires into tenured posi-
tions, the number of academics already aﬃliated and in tenured positions, and the number
of tenured professors that retire in a given year. Apart from the total number of new hires,
the panel contains the number of new hires that start their ﬁrst tenured position at a pub-
lic university (junior hires) and the number of new hires that move from another tenured
aﬃliation (senior hires). Furthermore, the panel also contains the number of people who
leave a tenured position. For all of the categories of academics, the department panel
contains average productivity variables, where the average productivity is calculated as
the average number of publications weighted by impact factor, in the preceding six years.
Lastly, the panel comprises data regarding the average productivity and the hiring budget
of the departments, as well as the total number of retirees in a given year. The precise
deﬁnition and construction of all these variables is described in the next section.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows; I describe each of the three input data
sets in more detail, before providing a description of the preparation, manipulation and
matching procedures used to generate the eventual department-level panel data set used
for the empirical tests in this thesis. All data handling was done using Python, unless
indicated otherwise.
6This concerns self-reported career information. Because of the self-reported nature of this information
and the corresponding self-selection bias this may introduce in my data set, I rely on FuL information
regarding the timing of aﬃliation changes wherever I can. I checked for the consistency of the infor-
mation on the timing of aﬃliation changes in FuL and DGK. The timing information in DGK diﬀers
from that in FuL for 5% of the individuals that change a (tenured) aﬃliation at least once.
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3.1 Input Data sets
Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender (DGK) is a bibliographic and bibliometric en-
cyclopedia of academics aﬃliated with German, Austrian and Swiss universities. All people
who have passed the "venia legendi" and are both actively teaching and researching at a
relevant university in Germany, Austria and Switzerland are included in DGK. The "ve-
nia legendi" encompasses the "habilitation" (a post-doctoral qualiﬁcation that is acquired
through publication of a habilitation thesis after up to six years of research as part of
a full professor's research group ("Lehrstuhl")) and a qualiﬁcation to teach at university
level (the "Lehrbefugnis"). An exception to the venia legendi rule for inclusion in DGK
are Honorarprofessoren and Juniorprofessoren. Universities considered relevant for DGK
are generally those that can reward doctoral degrees ("Promotionsrecht"). This includes
all public universities that I restrict attention to. Academics who move to a university
outside of Germany, Austria or Switzerland are generally dropped from the encyclopedia,
unless they personally request to remain included (Schniederjuergen 2013a). people who
can no longer be veriﬁed to be aﬃliated with a university are dropped from the encyclo-
pedia too. The information in DGK stems from academic calenders/teaching schedules,
announcements of appointments by universities and in academic and professional journals,
surveys, university websites, etc. (Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender 2006, 2008).
De Gruyter Publishers, the current publishers of the DGK, have kindly supplied me with
the editorial database underlying the online DGK edition (current up to 13 July 2013),
as well as a copy of the exports from this database taken on 10-11-2006, 17-11-2008 and
27-09-2010. This database and its past exports contain the same information as the pub-
lished DGK editions from the same years (that is, all records of people complying with the
DGK inclusion criteria set out above), plus inactive records (of people who left (German,
Austrian or Swiss) academia, passed away or could no longer be traced), activation dates
of records (the date when a person ﬁrst complied with the DGK inclusion criteria and was
taken up in the database) and inactivation dates where applicable.7
7The ﬁrst DGK edition to also be published electronically (as a CD-rom) was the 17th edition, the hard
copy of which was released in 1996, the corresponding cd-rom in 1997. Subsequent CD-roms were
released in 2007 and 2009, along with the corresponding 21st and 22nd editions of the hard copy DGK
(Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender Online 2013). Since 2010 the DGK has an online version.
The editorial database underlying this online version is updated continuously. The DGK editorial
database was started in 1996, when the DGK data were migrated from the previous publisher to De
Gruyter (Schniederjuergen 2013b). The earliest activation dates in the database however appear to be
1999.
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Forschung und Lehre is Germany's largest higher education and research magazine
that has been published monthly by the German higher education association (Deutscher
Hochschulverband) since 1994 (Forschung und Lehre, "Wir ueber uns" 2014). Every mag-
azine contains a section titled "Habilitation und Berufungen" with announcements of ha-
bilitations, the acquisition of the Lehrbefugnis, and the receipt, acceptance or rejection
of academic (professorial) positions. These notiﬁcations are based on information from
press releases from universities, newspapers and professional magazines as well as from
readers/individual scientists (FuL 2002). Electronic copies of past Forschung und Lehre
magazines from 1996 onwards can be downloaded from the "archive" section of the mag-
azine's website (Forschung und Lehre 1999-2013). I use Forschung und Lehre magazines
from 1999 to 2013 for the individual and department-level data sets for this thesis, so as
to align with the years for which I have (activation) data from DGK.
The ISI Web of Science database (hereafter: ISI) is compiled and maintained by Thom-
son Reuters and can be accessed via the website apps.webofknowledge.com. From this
database, I restrict attention to publications from the following databases: Science Citation
Index Expanded (SCI-Expanded), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Arts and Human-
ities Citation Index (AHCI), Conference Proceedings Citation Index - Science (CPCI-S)
and the Conference Proceedings Citation Index - Social Sciences & Humanities (CPCI-
SSH). I restrict the scope to publications with at least one of the authors with a German
(work) address and published between 1993 and 2012, the records of which I downloaded
from the ISI website.8
3.2 Preparation, Manipulation and Matching of Data
FuL provides information regarding the timing and speciﬁcs of the obtainment of habilita-
tion and Lehrbefugnis as well as aﬃliation changes.9 As for habilitation or Lehrbefugnis
obtainment, I extract the name and current title of the person concerned, the current aﬃli-
8I am currently working on a code that singles out academics who move to Germany from another country,
so that I may compile more complete publication records for these academics on an individual level.
9I exploit the generally formulaic structure of the announcements in the Habilitationen und Berufungen
section in FuL to distill the desired information regarding habilitationen and professorial oﬀers in the
Forschung und Lehre magazines from the text blocks in the magazine and put these in a tabular format.
In the case of a habilitation and/or Lehrbefugnis announcement in FuL, the university at which the
Habilitation and/or Lehrbefugnis was obtained is usually mentioned, as is the respective ﬁeld. Profes-
sorial oﬀer ("Berufung") announcements generally mention an academic's current university aﬃliation
and title, the oﬀer university and oﬀered position (title and subject), as well as whether the oﬀer was
obtained (erhalten), accepted (angenommen), appointed (ernannt) or rejected (abgelehnt).
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ation of the person and, if diﬀerent, the university at which the qualiﬁcation was obtained,
the ﬁeld in which the qualiﬁcation was acquired, as well as the subject category under
which the announcement was made in the FuL magazine. I take the month and year of the
FuL issue in which the announcement was made to be the time when the qualiﬁcation was
obtained, backdated by four months to correct for the average printing lag. In the case of
a professorial oﬀer announcement, I record whether the oﬀer was accepted, appointed or
rejected, the name and current title of the person concerned, the current aﬃliation of the
person, the oﬀer university, oﬀered position and ﬁeld in which the position is oﬀered, as
well as the subject category under which the announcement was made in the FuL maga-
zine.10 Here too, I take the month and year of the FuL issue in which the announcement
was made to be the time when the qualiﬁcation was obtained, backdated by four months
to correct for the average printing lag.11
I make the information in the three databases compatible by replacing university names
in the FuL and DGK databases with unique identiﬁers, classifying all subject areas dis-
tinguished in DGK and ISI under 12 broad categories12, mapping titles and positions to a
uniﬁed dictionary of existing titles and positions, and classifying a title or position as being
tenured or non-tenured13. Subsequently, I distill a list of unique academics from both the
FuL and DGK records. In order to do so, I deduplicate the lists of academics from FuL
and DGK on last name, initials and subject area14.
10In case of multiple oﬀers, I always record accepted or appointed oﬀers ﬁrst, followed by oﬀers that are
obtained. I record rejected oﬀers last. In case of only obtained oﬀers, I record oﬀers from German
universities ﬁrst, otherwise the order is random.
11Oﬀers that were only reported as being obtained by FuL are backdated by 2 months only, reﬂecting the
fact that oﬀer acceptance or rejection is reported two months later on average.
12These are the categories distinguished in the 'Habilitationen und Berufungen section' of FuL: theology;
philosophy and history; social sciences; philology and cultural studies; law; economics; mathemat-
ics, physics and computer science; biology, chemistry, earth sciences and pharmaceutics; engineering;
agricultural sciences, nutrition and veterinary medicine; medicine (human); dentistry.
13The following are tenured positions: C3-Professor/W2-Professor/Ausserordentliche Professor/Associate
Professor and C4-Professor/W3-Professor/Ordentliche Professor/U(niversitaets)-Prof.
14DGK records each have a unique identiﬁer in the underlying database.
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3.2.1 Matching up Databases
I match academics appearing in FuL with academics in DGK on the basis of their last
name15, subject area16 and initials17. Furthermore, I discard a potential match if:
a) a person's last (most recent) announcement in FuL is made while a potential
match in DGK is over 67 years old18 (based on birth year given in DGK)
b) a potential DGK match has a date of passing that falls before the last (most)
recent announcement year in FuL
c) a potential DGK match is reported to have retired in DGK-year-x, while there
are FuL announcements after year x
d) a potential DGK match is reported as having a tenured position before the
habilitation year reported in FuL19
As mentioned above, 83% of academics who appeared as having a tenured aﬃliation with
a German university in FuL can be matched to academics listed in DGK.
I match publications from ISI to academics appearing in FuL and DGK on last name,
initials and subject area. If no match on last name, initials and ﬁeld is possible, a match
on last name and initials is attempted20. Whenever a match is found, I augment the
publication count of a person in the given ISI publication year by the impact factor of the
journal in which the publication appeared. I discard academics who share the same last
name, initials and ﬁeld are discarded from the data set, to prevent attributing publications
of multiple diﬀerent academics to multiple academics sharing last name, initials and ﬁeld.
15Speciﬁcally; the name after the last space in the full name ﬁeld, with potential hyphens of composite
last names deleted (so e.g. Schmidt-Angel becomes SchmidtAngel).
16At least one of the FuL-ﬁeld codes for the subject areas in which a person appears to work in DGK must
be the same as the FuL-ﬁeld code the person is classed under in FuL. If an academic does not have
a subject area listed in DGK or if this subject area could not be classiﬁed under one of the FuL-ﬁeld
codes, a match is attempted on the basis of last name and initials only (but only if the subject area
recorded in DGK could not be mapped to an FuL ﬁeld code or if no subject area was recorded in DGK).
17Composite ﬁrst names are separated ﬁrst and the ﬁrst letter of all name components are taken to be
initials (e.g. Anna-Maria has initials A, M).
18German law mandates that academics retire at the age of 65 (Mohr 2007, Bundesbeamtengesetz 1985),
so unless an academic moves abroad around the time of mandated retirement in Germany (cf. Mohr
2007), I should not observe FuL announcements regarding new aﬃliations for an academic who is past
the age of retirement. I use 67 as cut-oﬀ instead of 65 to allow for some delay in a possible move abroad
or FuL's reporting thereof.
19Where I allow for up to a one year lag in this announcement to allow for obtainment of a tenured position
immediately upon passing the habilitation, as well as a publication lag in FuL.
20(but only if the subject area recorded in DGK could not be mapped to an FuL ﬁeld code or if no subject
area was recorded in DGK)
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3.2.2 Creating an Individual-Level Panel
The starting point for the individual-level panel of aﬃliations over time are the FuL an-
nouncements. I supplement and check these with information from DGK. For any FuL
oﬀer announcement the current university of a person, his current position (title) and
whether this concerns a tenured aﬃliation is ﬁlled back in time from the year before the
FuL announcement year to the year that FuL reported as the year in which the person
passed his habilitation or Lehrbefugnis; or, if this data is not available, the year in which
the person is reported to have passed his habilitation in DGK21; or, if that is not available
either, the activation year of the person's record in DGK, or the start year of the panel 
whichever is earlier22,23.
If the FuL announcement concerns an accepted oﬀer, the new university, new position
(title) and whether the position is tenured or not is ﬁlled forward from the year of the FuL
announcement to the last year of the panel, or the year of passing or inactivation of the
record if reported in DGK  whichever is earlier. If the FuL announcement concerns an
appointment (ernannt), if a university diﬀerent from the current university is given this
is taken to be the oﬀer university, if not, the current university is taken to be the oﬀer
university. The oﬀer university, oﬀered position (title) and whether this position is tenured
or not is ﬁlled forward as in the case of an accepted oﬀer. If the FuL announcement states
that an oﬀer was rejected, the current university, current position and whether the position
is tenured or not is ﬁlled forward as above. Finally, for an announcement of a received
oﬀer (erhalten), the information regarding the oﬀer university, position and whether the
position is tenured or not is stored in a temporary list. If FuL reports the oﬀer got accepted
or rejected at a later date, the oﬀer information is recorded in the manner described above
for the respective announcement type. If there are no further FuL announcements regarding
the oﬀer, it is checked with information in DGK to attempt to conﬁrm whether the oﬀer
was accepted or rejected. If the current university of the FuL announcement is matched by
the university aﬃliation recorded in DGK, this aﬃliation is ﬁlled forward as above. If the
21This is based on self-reported information
22If an aﬃliation is already ﬁlled out in the year before the oﬀer announcement, the current position is not
ﬁlled backwards, but merely checked for consistency with the aﬃliation already recorded in the panel.
If the two do not match up, an error message is created and the case is left for further, case-by-case
evaluation.
23As mentioned before, the FuL announcement date is backdated by 4 months to correct for the average
lag in reporting of oﬀer information, so that the announcement of an accepted oﬀer in e.g. February
2003 is interpreted as the oﬀer being accepted in 2002.
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oﬀer university of the FuL "erhalten" announcement is matched by the university recorded
in DGK, this aﬃliation is ﬁlled forward as above24.
Whenever an academic changes aﬃliation according to data in DGK, but no announce-
ment of a change appears in FuL, the start date of the new aﬃliation is taken from the
self-reported career history in DGK, or, if that is not available, is taken to be the year
after the previous DGK data year, or - if this is earlier - the minimum of the habilitation's
year and activation year.
3.2.3 From Individual-Level to Department-Level Panel
For each academic, I derive 5 auxiliary variables. I deﬁne the 'start-date' of a person's
academic career as the minimum of the year in which he ﬁrst publishes, the year in which
he received his habilitation or Lehrbefugnis as reported in FuL or DGK, and the activation
date reported in DGK. I take the 'end-date' of a person's academic career to be the
minimum of the last year in which I see a person publish, his date of passing and the
inactivation date reported in DGK. Furthermore, for every year in the panel, I calculate
the number of publication years, the sum total of impact factor weighted publications
and the average number of impact factor weighted publications in the 6 years up to and
including year t. In this time-span I only count years in which the person is considered
academically active towards the number of publication years, and it is this number that
I use as denominator of the average number of weighted publications. I then calculate
the mean and standard deviation of the number of publication years, the sum of weighted
publications and the average number of weighted publications at the department level,
for the sample of academics who have a tenured aﬃliation at the university and are not
retired yet. I use the year in which someone turns 66 as the year in which he no longer
takes his seat due to retirement25. I also calculate the number of people retiring from a
given department as well as from the university as a whole in a certain year, the number of
new hires (deﬁned as people not at department x in year t-1, or at x but not in a tenured
position), aﬃliates (people in the same department, in a tenured position in year t-1) and
the total faculty (sum of new hires and aﬃliates).
24If neither the current university nor the oﬀer university from the FuL announcement is matched by
information in DGK, a record of the mismatch is made in an error ﬁle and left for further, manual
inspection. In the case of such a mismatch the current university, position and tenure variable are ﬁlled
forward, as outlined above.
25The legal retirement age in Germany is 65 (Mohr 2007, Bundesbeamtengesetz 1985), so I take the year
after this lustrum to be the year in which the pensioner's position may be reﬁlled.
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4 Eﬀort and Selection Eﬀects of
Performance Pay in Knowledge
Creation
4.1 Introduction
Universities constitute an important economic sector. The sector is not just important
in terms of direct value and exports (McCormack et al. 2014), it also accounts for a
signiﬁcant portion of basic and applied research in an economy (Lach and Schankerman
2008). In turn, investments in research and education at universities have been shown to
come with considerable localised spillovers (Kantor and Whalley 2014, Agrawal 2001) and
act as a catalyst for innovation at a national level (Aghion et al. 2010, Acemoglu et al.
2006). Consequently, it is important to understand factors determining the performance
of universities, ranging from general management practices (McCormack et al. 2014) to
speciﬁc incentives like inventor royalty shares (Lach and Schankerman 2008 and 2004) and
external factors such as a university's autonomy and the amount of competition it faces
(Aghion et al. 2010). This chapter aims to add to this literature by zooming in to the level
of academics and studying the eﬀort and selection eﬀect of performance pay in academia.
Using the introduction of performance pay in German academia as a natural experiment,
I ﬁnd that performance pay increases eﬀort by 35% and that more productive academics
self-select into the pay scheme.
In order to estimate the eﬀort eﬀect of performance pay in academia, I exploit the
fact that academics who make tenure just before the academic pay reform fall under the
old, age-related pay scheme, while those who make tenure just after the reform are paid
according to the new, performance pay scheme. If the timing of the tenure decision is
exogenous, a diﬀerential change in productivity from before to after the reform between
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academics who make tenure just before the reform and those who tenure directly after the
reform can be interpreted as the causal eﬀect of performance pay on eﬀort. I estimate this
eﬀort eﬀect in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework using the academics who make tenure
directly after the reform as treatment group and those who make tenure just before as
control group. I ﬁnd that performance pay increases eﬀort by 35%. Roughly two-thirds
(23%) of this eﬀort eﬀect can be ascribed to the tournament component of the performance
pay scheme, with the remaining third (12%) caused by the piece-rate component.
I ﬁnd no evidence of pre-existing trends, lending support to the identifying parallel
trends assumption of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation. Furthermore, I perform a
number of tests to assess the validity of the assumption that the timing of the tenure
decision is exogenous. I ﬁnd no eﬀect of the performance pay reform on academic eﬀort in
a placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, using two cohorts of academics who make tenure before
the performance pay reform as placebo treatment and control. Since both these cohorts fall
under the age-related pay scheme, the pay reform should not have any diﬀerential eﬀect on
their productivity. If, however, either lower productivity academics or higher productivity
academics were able to speed up the tenure process, and if their productivity growth would
slow down, respectively speed up after tenure, the placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences would
return a negative, respectively positive eﬀort eﬀect. I ﬁnd no evidence of this.
The second part of the chapter is devoted to estimation of the selection eﬀect of per-
formance pay in academia. Academics who hold a tenured position when the reform is
implemented switch from the age-related pay system to the performance pay system when
they change their aﬃliation or position. Because pay no longer increases with age in the
performance pay system but only with productivity, I expect more productive professors
to be more likely to select into the performance pay scheme by changing position or aﬃlia-
tion. Hazard rate and survival function analyses conﬁrm that more productive academics
are indeed more likely to switch to the performance pay scheme. Moreover, an academic's
productivity has a greater eﬀect on his probability of selecting into performance pay if
he is younger, in line with the performance pay scheme being relatively less attractive for
older academics because of a larger diﬀerence in basic wage between the age-related and
performance pay scheme.
As mentioned above, this chapter aims to contribute to the literature on university gov-
ernance (cf. Haeck and Verboven 2012, Aghion et al. 2010, Belenzon and Schankerman
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2009, Lach and Schankerman 2008, 2004) in particular, and to the literature on the organ-
isation of knowledge creation (Grigoriou and Rothaermel 2014, Phelps et al. 2012, Jones
2009, Wuchty et al. 2007, Singh 2005, Audretsch and Feldman 2004, 1996, Jaﬀe et al.
1993)) more generally. By studying the eﬀort and selection eﬀects of performance pay in
academia, this chapter studies one of the key components of human resource management,
incentive systems, (cf. Lazear and Oyer 2012, Bloom and Reenen 2011, Oyer and Schaefer
2011, Lazear and Shaw 2007) in relation to university governance, thus building on and
adding to the vast literature on incentives in organizations as well as that on university
management and the organisation of knowledge creation.
Within the body of literature on incentives, numerous papers have examined how incen-
tives aﬀect worker productivity empirically, and many of those report signiﬁcant positive
eﬀort eﬀects of higher powered incentive schemes, both in the ﬁeld (e.g. Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2011, Shi 2010, Lavy 2009, Bandiera et al. 2005, Shearer 2004, Lazear 2000a)
and in the lab (i.a. Hossain and List 2012, Boly 2011, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Carpenter
et al. 2010, Freeman and Gelber 2010, Bellemare et al. 2010, Ariely et al. 2009, Dickinson
and Villeval 2008, Dickinson 1999). The kinds of higher-powered incentive schemes that
have been shown to have positive eﬀort eﬀects are several; from piece-rate pay (cf. Dohmen
and Falk 2011, Shi 2010, Bellemare et al. 2010, Ariely et al. 2009, Bandiera et al. 2005,
Shearer 2004, Lazear 2000a, Dickinson 1999) or bonus pay (i.a. Hossain and List 2012,
Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Lavy 2009) to tournament schemes (cf. Carpen-
ter et al. 2010, Freeman and Gelber 2010, Harbring et al. 2004) and monitoring regimes
(e.g. Boly 2011, Dickinson and Villeval 2008). It is not a given that performance pay
schemes would increase academic eﬀort too, since academics are thought to be intrinsi-
cally motivated (McCormack et al. 2014), and extrinsic incentives might crowd out this
intrinsic motivation (Dickinson and Villeval 2008, Besley and Ghatak 2005). The empirical
results in this paper however provide evidence of a positive eﬀort eﬀect of both a piece-rate
component and a tournament component of performance pay in academia. Though some
papers have studied the eﬀort eﬀect of performance pay in education, either by estimating
the eﬀect of teacher incentives (cf. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011, Glewwe et al.
2010) or student incentives (i.a. Bettinger 2012, Leuven et al. 2011, Angrist and Lavy
2009, Angrist et al. 2009), this chapter is, to the best of my knowledge, one of only few
works to study the eﬀort eﬀect of performance pay on academics, particularly with respect
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to research productivity. Lach and Schankerman (2008) and (2004) also study the eﬀect of
incentives on research productivity, but research productivity is measured at the university,
not individual academic level in these papers, so that they cannot estimate the eﬀort eﬀect
directly.
Within the body of literature on incentive schemes, there is also a number of papers
studying sorting into pay schemes. Dohmen and Falk (2011) and Lazear (2000a) for in-
stance study the selection eﬀect of piece-rate schemes for workers in a lab experiment
and in the ﬁeld for windshield installers, respectively, and both papers ﬁnd that higher
productivity workers self-select into the higher-powered pay scheme. Leuven et al. (2011)
report a similar ﬁnding for selection in tournament schemes for students. This chapter
provides evidence that performance pay also has a positive and signiﬁcant selection eﬀect
in academia. The selection eﬀect thus reinforces the eﬀort eﬀect, both contributing to a
greater productivity under performance pay.
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section presents a simple theoretical
framework. The empirical analysis and core of the chapter make up section 3, with the ﬁrst
part focusing on the eﬀort eﬀect and the second part on the selection eﬀect of performance
pay. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section I present a simple theoretical model to analyse the eﬀects of performance
pay on the eﬀort and selection of workers, modelled speciﬁcally to reﬂect the speciﬁc
features of the performance pay reform in German academia, much like Lazear (2000a).
As in Kräkel and Sliwka (2004), I consider a multi-stage game. At the beginning of every
period, academics ﬁrst select a pay scheme - either age-related or performance pay - and
subsequently choose an eﬀort level. They get paid at the end of a period. I solve for pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Suppose academics live and work for two periods. In each period, an academic's output
depends on his eﬀort e, ability θ ≥ θ > 0 and a random noise draw ε. The noise terms are
assumed to be iid draws from a distribution g (.) with mean zero and variance σ2. In any
given period, output is then given by:
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y (ei; θi) = f (ei; θi) + εi (4.2.1)
The production function f (.; .) increases in both it's arguments, so f1, f2 > 0. Furthermore,
let f (0, .) = f (., 0) = 0, f11 ≤ 0 and f12 > 0. That is, I assume that no output is produced
when an academic does not expend any eﬀort, there are diminishing marginal returns to
eﬀort, and more able academics have a larger marginal productivity of eﬀort at any eﬀort
level. Academics learn their ability at the beginning of the ﬁrst period.
4.2.1 Baseline - Age-Related Pay
Before the pay reform, academics receive wages that increase with age. Though these
age-related wages do not vary with an academic's performance, in what follows I allow for
intrinsic motivation, which links an academic's utility to his performance1. Let academics
be risk-neutral, expected pay-oﬀ maximisers. In the age-related system utility depends
on the age-speciﬁc wage wa, increases with output yi at rate ra > 0 (capturing intrinsic
motivation and possible bonuses for C4-professors)2, and decreases with the cost of eﬀort
C (ei). In any given period, the expected utility in the age-related pay scheme for academic
i with age a who exerts eﬀort ei can then be written as:
E [Ui,a] = wa + r
aE [y (ei; θi)]− C (ei) = wa + raf (ei; θi)− C (ei) (4.2.2)
The cost function C (ei) is convex in eﬀort, so C ′, C” > 0, and C (0) = 0.3
1Furthermore, professors at the highest pay level in the age-related system, C4 professors, received bonuses
for oﬀers received after their ﬁrst appointment as C4 professor (Dilger 2013, Detmer and Preissler 2006).
Hence for C4 professors, part of their pay might depend on their (past) performance (to the extent that
good performance increases the chances of receiving a second or third C4 oﬀer). However, as noted
in the previous chapter, these bonuses made up only about 3.55% of the total nationwide pay volume
for professors according to Handel (2005), using data from Expertenkommission (2000). Furthermore,
using data from the Ministry of Science and Culture of Niedersachsen, Handel (2005) ﬁnds that only
about 16.5% of the Professors in Niedersachsen enjoyed such attraction bonuses.
2Here, the superscript a denotes age-related pay.
3Many papers model heterogeneity in agents through diﬀerent cost functions, with higher ability agents
having a lower marginal cost of eﬀort (Lazear 2000b, Schotter and Weigelt 1992, Bull et al. 1987). As
noted by Chen (2003), a speciﬁcation in which ability aﬀects productivity allows for an unambiguous
deﬁnition of absolute and comparative ability and comparative statics with respect to ability. Het-
erogeneity is modelled as ability aﬀecting productivity in i.a. Gürtler and Kräkel (2010), Kräkel and
Sliwka (2004), Chen (2003).
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4.2.2 Performance Pay
In the performance pay scheme, an academic's basic wage does no longer depend on his age,
but any tenured professor can earn attraction or retention bonuses. A better performance
increases the chances that an academic receives an oﬀer and an attraction or retention
bonus, eﬀectively increasing the rate at which an academic's utility increases with his
output. This can be modelled as the rate r being greater in the performance pay scheme:
rp > ra (where p denotes performance pay and a age-related pay)4. The performance pay
scheme also introduces on-the-job performance bonuses distributed through tournaments.
In a simple two-player tournament, academic i wins the tournament if yi > yj . This
happens with probability
Pr (f (ei; θi) + εi > f (ej ; θj) + εj) = Gεj−εi (f (ei; θi)− f (ej ; θj)) (4.2.3)
where Gεj−εi (.) is the cdf of εj−εi and εj−εi ∼ g (εj − εi). The distribution g (εj − εi) has
mean zero and variance 2σ2 because εi and εj are iid5. Denote the on-the-job performance
bonus that can be won in the tournament by b > 0 and deﬁne 4fij (e; θ) ≡ f (ei; θi) −
f (ej ; θj). The expected utility under performance pay can then be written as:
E [Ui] = w + r
pf (ei; θi) + bGεj−εi (4fij (e; θ))− C (ei) (4.2.4)
In the ﬁrst period, the basic wage an academic would earn in the performance pay
system, wp1, is larger than the basic wage he earns in the age-related pay system, w
a
1 , with
probability λ. In period 2, the basic wage that academics earn in the age-related pay
system (wa2) is larger than the basic wage they would earn in the performance pay scheme
(wp2). This reﬂects the fact that the basic wage in the age-related pay scheme increases
with age and the basic wage in the age-related pay scheme starts to exceed that in the
performance pay scheme at age 33 or 436 (Oeﬀentlicher-Dienst 2004, Handel 2005).
Future utility is discounted by a factor δ, 0 < δ < 1.
4I thus assume that if the extrinsic motivation provided by the attraction and retention bonus crowds out
intrinsic motivation, this crowding out is less than one-for-one. In the empirical section, I will provide
evidence that is in line with this assumption.
5This follows the speciﬁcation of the winning probabilities in a rank order tournament in Lazear and
Rosen (1981).
6The age at which the basic wage in the age-related pay scheme ﬁrst exceeds that in the performance pay
scheme is 43 only if a C3-professor is oﬀered a W3-professorship.
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4.2.3 Eﬀort Eﬀect
I solve for subgame-perfect equilibria of this two-period, two-stage game by backward
induction. Hence, I ﬁrst solve for the optimal eﬀort level in the second period. Under the
age-related pay scheme, academics maximise 4.2.2 with respect to eﬀort ei. The optimal
eﬀort level e∗i is then given by the ﬁrst order condition:
ra
∂f (e∗i ; θi)
∂ei
= C ′ (e∗i ) (4.2.5)
By the implicit function theorem, we have that
de
dθ
(e∗i ) =
−raf12 (e∗i , θ)
raf11 (e∗i , θ)− C” (e∗i )
> 0 (4.2.6)
Hence higher ability academics exert greater eﬀort in equilibrium even in the age-related
pay system, provided academics are intrinsically motivated. It follows that higher ability
academics also produce more output in equilibrium.
In the performance pay system, academics choose their eﬀort level to maximise 4.2.4. As
I solve for pure strategy Nash equilibria, academic i takes ej as given when determining his
eﬀort level, and similarly for j (Lazear and Rosen 1981). If an interior solution exists, i's
equilibrium eﬀort under the performance pay scheme is given by the ﬁrst-order condition:
[
rp + bgεj−εi (4fij (e∗; θ))
] ∂f (e∗i ; θi)
∂ei
= C ′ (e∗i ) (4.2.7)
A similar ﬁrst-order condition gives j's equilibrium eﬀort.
An interior solution exists if σ2 is suﬃciently large, so that the rate of change of the
probability density g (εj − εi) is not too large positive (Bhattacharya and Guasch 1988,
Lazear and Rosen 1981). More precisely, an interior solution exists if the following second-
order condition is met:
[
rp + bgεj−εi (4fij (e∗; θ))
] ∂2f (e∗i ; θi)
∂e2i
+ bg
′
εj−εi (4fij (e∗; θ))
(
∂f (e∗i ; θi)
∂ei
)2
−C ′′ (e∗i ) < 0
(4.2.8)
Proposition 1 - Eﬀort Eﬀect: Academics exert greater eﬀort in any given period in
the performance pay scheme than in the age-related pay scheme in a pure strategy subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. (Proof in Appendix A)
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Corollary 1: Academics produce more output under the performance pay scheme.
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1 and the assumption that output
strictly increases with eﬀort.
Because both the attraction and retention bonuses and the on-the-job performance tour-
naments increase the marginal return to productivity7, academics are expected to exert
greater eﬀort and hence produce more output under performance pay than under age-
related pay. I would therefore expect the academic pay reform to have a positive eﬀort
eﬀect.
4.2.4 Selection Eﬀect
When the academic pay reform is implemented, academics have diﬀerent ages. Equiva-
lently, in the model an agent might be at the beginning of period one or two when the
reform is implemented and he ﬁrst gets to select a pay scheme. The basic wages of the two
pay schemes compare diﬀerently at diﬀerent ages, with the diﬀerence between age-related
basic wage and the basic wage in the performance pay scheme being larger positive for
older academics. The performance pay scheme is therefore relatively more attractive in
the short-run for younger academics, who are at the beginning of period 1 when the reform
is implemented, than for older academics, who are at the beginning of period 2 when they
ﬁrst get to choose a pay scheme.
Proposition 2 - Selection Eﬀect: If at least some academics prefer to remain in the
age-related pay scheme after the pay reform, only higher ability academics, whose ability
θ exceeds a threshold value θ01 prefer to select into performance pay. This threshold ability
level is larger for older academics. (Proof in Appendix A)
When comparing utility under age-related pay with that under performance pay, there
are two counteracting eﬀects. On the one hand, the portion of utility that depends on
output and, by extension, eﬀort, is larger in the performance pay scheme than in the age-
related pay scheme for any eﬀort level. On the other hand, the basic wage is larger in the
age-related pay scheme for most ages. Because higher ability academics have a greater
marginal productivity, and because the return to productivity in the performance pay
scheme is larger, the former eﬀect is more likely to outweigh the latter for higher ability
7Provided extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation less than one-for-one.
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academics. Furthermore, since the diﬀerence between the age-related basic wage and the
basic wage in the performance pay scheme is larger for older academics, the drop in basic
wage is more likely to outweigh the higher return to productivity under performance pay
for older academics. Put another way, older academics need to be of higher ability in order
for the higher return to productivity to outweigh the drop in basic wage when switching
to performance pay.
The next section reports the results of empirical tests of the hypotheses regarding the
eﬀort and selection eﬀect of performance pay in academia put forward in propositions 1
and 2.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
In order to study eﬀort and selection eﬀects of performance pay in knowledge creation,
I use the individual level panel data set that I constructed for this research project and
that encompasses the aﬃliations and productivity measures of the universe of academics
in German academia for the years 1999-2013. This individual level panel comprises 55132
academics who held a tenured position at a German public university at some point be-
tween 1999 and 2013. The data set provides information regarding an academic's aﬃlia-
tion, reporting whether his position is tenured, and whether he is aﬃliated with a public
university in a given year. Furthermore, the data set contains a variable for the impact
factor-weighted8 number of publications of an academic in a given year and the average
number of weighted publications in the previous six years. Furthermore, the data set pro-
vides the year in which an academic obtained his postdoctoral qualiﬁcation, as well as the
year a person started working in academia. Finally, there is a birth year variable and, if
applicable, year of passing.
As discussed in the previous chapter, I restrict attention to academics who held a tenured
position at a German public university between 1999 and 2013, because the reform only
changes the pay schemes of academics at public higher education institutions, and per-
formance bonuses can be earned in tenured positions only9. I discard higher education
institutions other than universities, because I focus on research output, and the research
8A publication is weighted by the impact factor of the journal in the publication year, where the impact
factors are taken from Journal Citation Report (2000-2012).
9Juniorprofessors, the German equivalent of assistant professors, can earn a yearly bonus in the per-
formance pay system, but this is only very small compared to the bonuses tenured professors can
earn.
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output of universities is incomparable to that of other higher education institutions.
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1, Panel A reports a few summary statistics for the individual level panel used for
the eﬀort eﬀect analysis below. The main variable of interest is the weighted number of
publications of academics in a given year. As the summary statistics in the table show,
academics at public universities are on average more productive than academics at other
higher education institutions (compare rows 1 and 2), while tenured professors at public
universities are more productive than nontenured academics at public universities (compare
rows 2 and 3). Academics who are in the early stages of their academic career and manage
to obtain a tenured position at a public university are more productive still (cf. row 4).
Row 4 shows the weighted number of publications of academics who make tenure at a
public university either just before the reform, in 2003 or 2004, or directly after, in 2005
or 200610. The former cohort comprises 2193 academics, the latter 1524, and I restrict
attention to these cohorts to estimate the eﬀort eﬀect of performance pay as explained
below.
4.3.2 Eﬀort Eﬀect
In order to identify the pure eﬀort eﬀect of the introduction of performance pay in German
academia, I use the fact that any contract for a professorial position at a public univer-
sity in Germany signed or renegotiated as of 1 January 2005 necessarily falls under the
performance pay scheme, whereas any contract signed before this date falls under the old,
age-related pay scheme11. Accordingly, academics who start their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation
before 2005 continue to fall under the age-related pay scheme12, whereas academics who
10To be exact, I restrict attention to academics who make tenure in 2003 or 2004, respectively 2005 or
2006, and who are aﬃliated with a public university at some point in the post-reform period. This also
includes academics who spent some of the post-reform period at another higher education institution.
As the summary statistics show, academics at higher education institutions other than universities
publish less on average, and if they are at a private university, they are not aﬀected by the pay reform.
The productivity of academics not at public universities should therefore change less in response to
the reform, and the below estimates of the eﬀort eﬀect are a lower bound. The estimates of the eﬀort
eﬀect reported below are robust to restricting attention to academics who were aﬃliated with public
universities throughout the post-reform period, and, as expected, larger.
11With the exception of Bremen, Niedersachsen and Rheinland-Pfalz, who introduced performance pay
before this deadline (in 2003 and 2004, respectively) (Detmer and Preissler 2005). Note that using
2005 as uniform before-after cut-oﬀ yields a conservative measure of the eﬀort eﬀect, since some of the
control group is in fact already treated before this time.
12They would be promoted to a higher pay grade in the age-related pay scheme when making tenure
(Detmer and Preissler 2004).
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make tenure after 2004 switch to the performance pay scheme upon making tenure. If
the timing of the tenure decision is exogenous, the performance incentives that ﬁrst-time
tenured aﬃliates face is exogenous as well. I can then identify the pure eﬀort eﬀect of
performance pay on academic productivity by comparing the change in productivity of
academics who start their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation before 2005 (the control group) with the
change in productivity of academics who start their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation as of 1 January
2005 (the treatment group) from before to after the pay reform. However, it is not ex ante
obvious whether the timing of the tenure decision is exogenous. In particular, academics
could try to speed up the process in order to avoid the performance pay system. I provide
a number of tests that yield no evidence of this below.
Table 4.2 shows the unconditional means of academic productivity for the treatment
and control group and before and after reform periods separately13. I use a two-year
window before and after the reform to deﬁne the treatment and control group in order
to abstract from seniority eﬀects. Thus the treatment group consists of academics who
ﬁrst made tenure in 2005 or 2006, while the the control group consists of academics who
ﬁrst made tenure in 2003 or 2004. Academic productivity is deﬁned here as the number
of impact-factor weighted publications of academic i in ﬁeld f in year t + xf , where xf
denotes the average publication lag in ﬁeld f . The average publication lags are taken from
Björk and Solomon (2013) and diﬀer across ﬁelds. I have data for 6 years before the reform
(1999-2004) and 9 years after the reform (2005-2013).
The diﬀerence in means estimate in Table 4.2, Panel A, column 3, row 1 shows that there
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in productivity between the treatment and control group before
the reform. After the reform however, the average productivity in the treatment group is
signiﬁcantly larger than that in the control group (cf. Column 3, row 2). Moreover, the
diﬀerence between these two diﬀerences is positive and signiﬁcant (cf. column 3, row3). If
assignment to the treatment and control group was indeed exogenous, so that, absent the
reform, the treatment group's productivity would have followed the same trend as that of
the control group, this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is an estimate of the causal eﬀect
of performance pay on academic eﬀort. This eﬀort eﬀect is economically large; amounting
13The means and diﬀerences in means are estimated through a pooled OLS regression of the lagged, weighted
number of publications of academics on a constant, a treatment dummy, a post dummy (that is 1 for the years
after the reform (2005-2013), and 0 before, so that I estimate persistent shifts in productivity from before to
after the reform) and a treatment*post interaction term. I estimated standard errors, clustered by individual
academic.
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to a 35% increase in academic productivity relative to the pre-reform productivity in the
control group. In what follows, I perform several checks of the validity of this estimate of
the eﬀort eﬀect.
The diﬀerences in means in columns 1 and 2 of row 3 in Panel A provide a ﬁrst such
check. Reassuringly, the average productivity of both the control group and the treatment
group increases from before to after the reform. Hence the positive diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate in column 3, row 3 really comes from a greater increase in the average productivity
of the treatment group than the control group instead of a (larger) decrease in productivity
in the control group. The fact that the average productivity of the control group also
increases after the reform is consistent with a positive average treatment eﬀect. This
aligns both with increased eﬀort from academics who still fall under the age-related pay
scheme to up their chances of receiving a lucrative job oﬀer in the performance pay scheme,
and with greater positive spillover eﬀects through increased positive assortative matching
(Ytsma 2015).
In order to test the identifying assumption that the assignment to treatment and control
is exogenous, I report the results of a placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation in Table
4.2, Panel B. Here, the placebo treatment group consists of academics who ﬁrst made
tenure in '03/'04 (the control group in Panel A), and the placebo control group consists of
academics who ﬁrst made tenure in '01/'02. If academics were able to inﬂuence the tenure
clock, I would expect lower productivity academics to try to move up the tenure decision
if it would allow them to stay in the age-related pay system. If not just the level but
also the growth rate of academic productivity is smaller for lower productivity academics,
this would decrease the growth in average productivity of the control group used above
(academics ﬁrst tenured in '03/'04) from before to after the reform. Consequently, the
change in average productivity of academics who ﬁrst tenured just before the reform (in
'03/'04) would then be smaller positive (or larger negative) than the change in average
productivity of an earlier cohort (academics who ﬁrst made tenure in '01/'02). As the
placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate in column 3, row 3 shows however, I do not ﬁnd
evidence of such selection into the '03/'04 ﬁrst tenure cohort. The average productivity of
both the placebo treatment and control group increases from before to after the reform (cf.
columns 1 and 2, row 3), and this increase is even slightly larger for the placebo treatment
group than the placebo control group, though not signiﬁcantly so.
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4.3.2.1 Baseline Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
As a next step I estimate the eﬀort eﬀect in a parametric diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model.
In particular, I estimate the following equation as a Fixed Eﬀects model (at the individual
level) in order to estimate the eﬀort eﬀect of the introduction of performance pay:
Yi,f,t−xf = αi + β1t+ β2post
′05 + β3post′05 ∗ Treatmenti + ui,t (4.3.1)
The corresponding estimation results are shown in Table 4.3. The dependent variable,
Yi,f,t−xf , denotes the lagged number of impact factor weighted publications of academic
i in ﬁeld f in year t − xf , where xf denotes the average publication lag in ﬁeld f as
before. The variable post′05 is 1 as of 2005 and 0 beforehand. The Treatment variable
is 1 for academics who start their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a public university in 2005
or 2006, and 0 otherwise. I restrict the sample to include only those academics who
start their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a public university in 2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006. The
post′05 ∗ Treatmenti interaction term is therefore a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate of
the eﬀort eﬀect of performance pay in knowledge creation, with academics who start their
ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a public university in 2003 or 2004 as the control group. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the individual level are reported throughout.
Column 1a in Table 4.3 reports the results from the baseline regression without linear
time trend t, column b shows the results from the baseline regression with linear time
trend. The post′05 ∗ Treatmenti interaction term is always positive and signiﬁcant, and
in the same order of magnitude of the post′05 coeﬃcient estimate. The estimate of the
interaction term implies that the academics starting their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation under the
performance pay system (the treatment group) produce on average about one and a half
weighted publication more than academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation under
the age-related pay system in every year after the reform. I thus ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀort
eﬀect that is highly signiﬁcant and economically large.
The post′05 coeﬃcient estimate in Column 1a is also positive and signiﬁcant, and eco-
nomically large. Including the time trend however turns the post′05 coeﬃcient negative
and signiﬁcant. This could be caused by mean reversion after promotion (here: making
tenure), as argued in Lazear (2004). The linear trend itself is positive and signiﬁcant, pro-
viding evidence that the number of weighted publications increases over time throughout
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the entire sample period. All in all, this suggests academics produce more as they grow
older (at least at the beginning of their academic career), and implies I ﬁnd no evidence
that the reform increases the productivity of the control group as well.
4.3.2.2 Pre-Existing Trends
To further validate the identiﬁcation strategy, I test for pre-existing trends. It could be that
the positive and signiﬁcant post′05 ∗ Treatmenti interaction term in the baseline simply
reﬂects pre-existing trend diﬀerences between the treatment and control group. As a ﬁrst
pass, I therefore estimate the following simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression equation
including a full set of treatment dummy * year dummy interactions:
Yi,f,t−xf = αi +
2013∑
yr=2001
(β1,yryr + β2,yryr ∗ Treatmenti) + ui,t (4.3.2)
Here, yr is a year dummy14, all other variables are as speciﬁed above and all regressions
contain individual ﬁxed eﬀects. As for the baseline regression 4.3.1, the sample is restricted
to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in
2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006, so that - as before - Treatment is 1 if an academic starts his
ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2005 or 2006 and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in
2003 or 2004 (the control group). The point estimates and 90% conﬁdence intervals of the
corresponding interaction terms are plotted in Figure 4.4.115. These interaction terms give
the year-on-year productivity diﬀerences between the treatment and control group.
The ﬁgure shows no sign of a pre-existing trend: the estimates of the year-on-year
diﬀerences ﬁrst become positive and signiﬁcant in 2005 only. They subsequently remain
positive and signiﬁcant for most of the post-reform period, so for most of the post-reform
period, the productivity of the treatment group is statistically signiﬁcantly larger than
that of the control group.
As an alternative test for pre-existing trends, I augment the baseline model in equation
4.3.1 with three placebo post variables - post−t − 3, post−t − 2, post−t − 1 - and their
interactions with the Treatment variable16. These placebo post variables are 1 as of
14Note that I include year dummies here (e.g. the 2005 dummy is 1 in 2005 only, and 0 otherwise) and
not post variables as in the baseline model in equation 4.3.1 (the post variable is 1 as of 2005 and 0
before).
15The estimation results are also reported in column 1 of Table 4.7 in appendix B.
16Where, as in the baseline model (4.3.1), the Treatment variable is 1 for academics who start their ﬁrst
tenured aﬃliation at a public university in 2005 or 2006, and 0 otherwise.
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2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively, and 0 beforehand. The estimation results in Table 4.3,
columns 2a and 2b conﬁrm that there is no evidence of a consistent pre-existing trend,
since the interactions of the placebo post variables with the Treatment variable are not all
positive and signiﬁcant. Reassuringly, including the pre-trend terms does not render the
post ∗ Treatmenti interaction term insigniﬁcant either, though the size of the coeﬃcient
does decrease.
Furthermore, I ﬁnd evidence of an announcement eﬀect in these regressions, because
the post−t− 3 ∗ Treatmenti interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant. This means that
academics who would tenure after the performance pay reform comes into eﬀect (as of 2005)
and hence would get paid under the performance pay scheme once tenured, step up their
game the moment the reform is announced (in 2002), so as to up their chances of earning
bonuses in the future17. The eﬀect amounts to about half a weighted publication more per
year since the announcement of the reform; a 12% increase in academic productivity relative
to the unconditional pre-reform productivity in the control group18. Given that only the,
eﬀectively, piece-rate component of the performance pay regime19 takes eﬀect from the
moment the reform is announced, this 12% increase in productivity can be interpreted
as the eﬀort eﬀect of the piece-rate component only. This means that the eﬀort eﬀect of
the tournament component of the performance pay scheme brings about a 23% increase
in productivity. The eﬀort eﬀect of competitive (tournament) pay is thus almost twice as
large as the eﬀort eﬀect of piece-rate pay.
4.3.2.3 Placebo Experiment
As a ﬁnal set of tests of the identiﬁcation strategy, I perform the same regressions for a
placebo treatment and control group. In Table 4.4 columns 1a and 1b, I show the results
of a placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences baseline regression (equation 4.3.1) with the placebo
treatment group comprising academics starting their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004
(the control group in the baseline regression in Table 4.3) and the placebo control group
made up of academics starting their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2001 or 2002. Given that
both these groups fall under the age-related pay system, there should be no diﬀerential
17Note that this evidence also aligns with the assumption that the extrinsic motivation provided by
the attraction and retention bonuses does not (completely) crowd out intrinsic motivation, since the
prospect of bonuses related to (past) performance causes academics who will tenure after the pay reform
to increase their eﬀort the moment the reform is announced.
18Cf. Table 4.2, column 2, row 1.
19Namely the prospect of attraction bonuses, which are linked to (past) performance.
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eﬀort eﬀect once the reform gets implemented. The fact that the post ∗ Placebo−Treati
interaction term is not signiﬁcant is in line with this. As discussed in the previous section,
these results do not provide evidence of endogenous selection into treatment and control
group either20.
Figure 4.4.2b depicts the conﬁdence intervals of the interaction terms in equation 4.3.2
when the sample is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at
a German public university in 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004, so that Treatment is 1 if an
academic starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004 (the placebo treatment group)
and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2001 or 2002 (the placebo control group). In
line with the results in Table 4.4, columns 1a and 1b, most of the year-on-year productivity
diﬀerences between placebo treatment and placebo control are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in the post reform (2005-2013) period, again allaying concerns about endogenous
selection into the treatment group.
Figure 4.4.2b also shows that the three interaction terms in the years surrounding tenure
of the treatment group (2003, 2004, 2005) are positive and signiﬁcant, This is to be ex-
pected, since academics need a good publication record to make tenure, and will therefore
make every eﬀort to publish (more) when their tenure clock is running out. Taking into
account that some publications counting towards tenure may not actually have been pub-
lished but only accepted by the time the tenure decision is made, allows for a relative
upswing in publications by newly tenured academics the year after they make tenure.
Such a surge in productivity around the time academics ﬁrst make tenure would however
only bias the baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates of the eﬀort eﬀect (Table 4.3) if it
causes a permanent increase in the level of productivity from the moment of ﬁrst tenure. In
order to test whether this is the case, I ﬁnally estimate the placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
model augmented with three placebo post variables - post−t−3, post−t−2, post−t−1 - and
their interactions with the Placebo − Treatment variable. The corresponding estimation
results in Table 4.4, columns 3 and 4 show that none of the interactions are positive and
signiﬁcant, thus I ﬁnd no evidence of a permanent upswing in the productivity level from
20Speciﬁcally, if lower productivity academics were able to speed up their tenure clock and if their pro-
ductivity would slow down more than the average mean reversion in the placebo control group upon
making tenure, the post−t − 2 ∗ Placebo−Treati interaction term or post−t − 1 ∗ Placebo−Treati in-
teraction term would be negative and signiﬁcant. If, on the other hand, higher productivity academics
were able to speed up their tenure clock and if their productivity would slow down less than the aver-
age mean reversion in the placebo control group, the post−t− 2 ∗ Placebo−Treati interaction term or
post−t− 1 ∗ Placebo−Treati interaction term would be positive and signiﬁcant. I do not ﬁnd evidence
of either type of selection.
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the moment an academic makes tenure.
4.3.3 Selection Eﬀect
Apart from academics who tenure after the reform, and therefore necessarily fall under
the performance pay scheme, academics who already have a tenured aﬃliation before 2005
can also select into the performance pay scheme by changing aﬃliation or position, or by
opting into the pay scheme while retaining the same position. I do not have information
on the latter, though Detmer and Preissler (2005) report that only a small number of
professors chose to opt into the W-pay scheme in their current position. I do however
observe professors changing aﬃliation or position and, consequently, changing into the
performance pay scheme. I exploit this information to analyse the selection eﬀect of the
reform. Given that a professor's pay increases with performance through bonuses in the
performance pay scheme, but no longer with age as in the age-related pay system, I expect
more productive academics to be more likely to select into the performance pay scheme21.
I test this hypothesis through hazard rate and survival function analysis in this section.
For this purpose, I derive survival data from the individual panel data set, in which
I focus on academics switching from the age-related pay scheme to the performance pay
scheme by renegotiating the contract of their current tenured position22 or by changing
to another tenured position, possibly at another university. In order to abstract from
academics entering the performance pay scheme because they make tenure after the reform,
I restrict attention to academics who already hold a tenured aﬃliation before 2005. There
are 37571 such academics and I observe a total of 3376 switches in a total of 248107
periods (years) that these academics can switch from the age-related to the performance
pay system (cf. Table 4.1, Panel B).
Figure 4.4.2 shows the Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the hazard function for
switches from age-related to performance pay for academics whose average productivity
falls in the top decile or bottom 90% of the average productivity distribution23. Panel a of
21Cf. proposition 2 in the theoretical model.
22I assume that, whenever an academic receives an oﬀer, he either accepts and changes position, or rejects
and renegotiates his current contract. In either case, the academic switches to the new performance
pay scheme if the change or renegotiation happens after the reform. If there are academics who do not
at least renegotiate their contract when they receive an oﬀer, these academics are more likely to be of
a lower productivity type, and including them in the pool of switchers would reduce the estimate of
the selection eﬀect I ﬁnd.
23Because only academics who already had a tenured aﬃliation before the reform can switch from age-
related to performance pay by changing aﬃliation or position, only these changes are considered here.
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Figure 4.4.2 uses contemporaneous average productivity measures, while Panel b employs
the average productivity data from 2005. Because an academic's average productivity
is calculated as the average number of impact factor weighted publications in years t-6
through t-1, the average productivity measures in 2005 abstract from the eﬀort eﬀect of the
performance pay reform. In both ﬁgures, the hazard rate for switching to the performance
pay scheme is clearly greater for top decile academics throughout, so higher productivity
academics are more likely to sort into the performance pay scheme. The Kaplan-Meier
estimates of the survival functions of staying in the old, age-related scheme in Figure 4.4.3
show the same result. A log-rank test of the equality of the survival functions of top decile
academics and bottom 90% academics rejects the equality of the survival functions at the
1% signiﬁcance level24.
I estimate the selection eﬀect of the introduction of performance pay parametrically by
estimating the following Weibull proportional hazard model:
λi,t = ρ ∗ exp [β0 + β1y¯i,t + β2agei,t + ui,t] ∗ tρ−1 (4.3.3)
The results of the estimation of this Weibull model are presented in Table 4.5. The model
estimates the hazard ratio for academics moving from one tenured aﬃliation to another
tenured aﬃliation at a public university25. As of 2005, any such move implies switching
from the age-related pay system to the performance pay system. In columns 1a and 2a
of Table 4.5, I only use the average productivity of academic i in year t: y¯i,t (the average
weighted number of publications of academic i in years t− 6 through t− 1) as explanatory
variable. In columns 1a and b, I use a contemporaneous measure of average productivity,
while in columns 2a and 2b, an academic's average productivity in 2005 is used to abstract
from eﬀort eﬀects. In columns 1b and 2b, I also include an age variable. This age variable
is calculated using an academic's reported birth year whenever available26, and equal to a
synthetic age otherwise. I calculate synthetic birth years by subtracting the average age
at habilitation or career start of academics for whom I do have a birth year27 from the
year of habilitation or career start of the academics for whom I do not have a birth year.
24When using the contemporaneous average productivity measure, the log-rank test returns a Chi-squared
statistic of 167.38 (p-value 0.0000). The log-rank test returns a Chi-squared statistic of 101.15 (p-value
0.0000) when using the 2005 average productivity measure.
25While being younger than 66 and hence not retired.
26I have birth year data for 43.3% of academics in the data set. In order to prevent selection bias, I
supplement the birth year data with synthetic birth year data in the analyses.
27The average age at habilitation or career start is 38.
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Synthetic age is then equal to the age imputed using the synthetic birth year for academics
for whom I do not know the actual birth year. I restrict the sample to academics with a
tenured aﬃliation at a public university after the reform, since only these academics have
the choice (i.e. are at risk) of switching pay scheme.
The coeﬃcient estimate of the average productivity of an academic, y¯i,t, is positive
and signiﬁcant throughout, suggesting that more productive academics are more likely to
select into the performance pay scheme. The coeﬃcient estimate in column 1a implies
that one extra impact factor weighted publication on average increases the probability of
selecting into the performance pay scheme by 0.3%. Adding age as covariate increases
the size of this coeﬃcient. This is not surprising, given the strong negative correlation
between age and average productivity. Indeed, one extra year of age is associated with an
almost 9% decrease in the probability that an academic will select into the performance pay
scheme. Accordingly, after controlling for age, the Weibull parameter ρ changes from being
a precisely estimated zero - indicating hazard does not change over time - to being positive
and signiﬁcant, in line with increasing hazard over time. This implies that academics are
more likely to switch to the performance pay system, the longer this system has been
around, perhaps because any uncertainty regarding the practical implications of the new
pay scheme is reduced as time goes by. The results are robust to using a contemporaneous
average productivity measure in columns 2a and 2b28.
4.3.3.1 Heterogeneous Hazard Rates
I next explore whether the hazard rates and their relationship with an academic's produc-
tivity vary by age category, and in particular whether I ﬁnd support for the prediction
in proposition 2 that older academics need to be of relatively higher ability than young
academics in order to prefer to switch to performance pay.
Table 4.6 reports the results of the separate estimation of the Weibull model given
in equation 4.3.3 for academics in diﬀerent age categories. The respective samples are
restricted to observations of academics younger than 37 in columns 1a and 1b, between
the ages of 37 and 48 in columns 2a and 2b, and 49 years of age or older in columns
3a and 3b. These categories are chosen so that the start age of the second category
is the average age at which the age-related basic wage starts to exceed the basic wage
28Estimation of equivalent Cox proportional hazard models yield similar results (results available upon
request)
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under performance pay, while the start age of the third category coincides with the age at
which academics earn the highest possible basic wage in the age-related system (and hence
no longer experience age-related increases in this basic wage). The average productivity
variable is a contemporaneous measure of average productivity in the a columns, while I
use an academic's average productivity in 2005 in the b columns to abstract from eﬀort
eﬀects.
As expected, the eﬀect of productivity on the switching hazard rate is largest for aca-
demics in the youngest age bracket; one extra impact factor weighted publication on aver-
age increases the probability of selecting into the performance pay scheme by 4 or 5%. In
contrast, for academics in the intermediate age bracket one extra impact factor weighted
publication on average increases the probability of selecting into the performance pay
scheme by only 0.6 or 0.9%, and this eﬀect reduces to only 0.4% for academics with the
maximum age-related pay level, in the highest age bracket. The negative and signiﬁcant
interaction term of age and productivity in the interaction-augmented Weibull proportional
hazard models in Table 4.8 in appendix B conﬁrms the ﬁnding that the eﬀect of average
productivity on the probability of selecting into performance pay decreases with age29.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter studies the eﬀort and selection eﬀect of performance pay in academia and
provides empirical evidence that academics signiﬁcantly increase eﬀort in response to per-
formance pay and that higher productivity academics are more likely to select into per-
formance pay. In order to do so, I use the introduction of performance pay in German
academia in 2002 as a natural experiment and employ a newly constructed data set en-
compassing information regarding research productivity and aﬃliations of the universe of
German academics. Before the reform, academics were all paid according to an age-related
pay scheme, in which the eﬀectively ﬂat wage increases with age. In contrast, in the per-
formance pay scheme implemented after the reform, academics earn a basic wage that does
not increase with age and is lower than the basic wage in the age-related pay scheme for
most ages. On top of this basic wage however, academics can now earn bonuses that are
partly distributed through on-the-job performance tournaments and partly through an,
eﬀectively, piece-rate scheme.
29Estimation of an equivalent Cox model yields equivalent results (results available upon request).
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In order to estimate the eﬀort eﬀect, the chapter exploits the fact that academics who
make tenure just before the reform fall under the old, age-related pay scheme, while aca-
demics who make tenure directly after the reform are paid according to the performance
pay scheme. If the timing of the tenure decision is exogenous, the diﬀerence in the change
in productivity from before to after the reform between the cohort making tenure just
before the reform and the cohort making tenure directly after, can be interpreted as the
causal eﬀect of performance pay on academic eﬀort. I estimate this diﬀerential change
in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework and ﬁnd an eﬀort eﬀect that amounts to a 35%
increase in productivity. About one-third of this eﬀort eﬀect is caused by the piece-rate
component of the performance pay scheme, with the remaining two-thirds instigated by
the on-the-job performance bonuses. A placebo diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation shows
that the identifying assumption of an exogenous tenure decision is plausible, as there is no
evidence of academics speeding up their tenure process. Furthermore, I ﬁnd no evidence
of pre-existing trends, which lends support to the identifying parallel-trends assumption of
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework.
I estimate the selection eﬀect though hazard rate and survival function analysis, where I
use the fact that any tenured professor who changes aﬃliation or position after the reform
automatically switches to the performance pay scheme. Because pay in the performance
pay scheme only increases with performance, and no longer with age, I expect to ﬁnd that
more productive academics are more likely to switch to performance pay. This selection
eﬀect is borne out by the analysis indeed and, moreover, I ﬁnd that this eﬀect is stronger
for younger academics. The latter ﬁnding aligns with the fact that the gap in basic wage
between the age-related pay and the performance pay scheme is larger for older academics.
By studying the eﬀort and selection eﬀect of performance pay in academia, the chapter
aims to contribute to and form a bridge between the literature on university governance
and incentives in organizations. Given the economic importance of the academic sector,
both in terms of direct economic value as well as for innovation and growth, it is crucial to
understand the factors that determine the performance of universities. The literature on in-
centives in organisations provides ample evidence that incentives can signiﬁcantly increase
performance, and this chapter shows that incentives can improve academic performance
too.
There are several steps than can be taken next. The current chapter focuses on research
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productivity of academics, but it would be very interesting and equally relevant to study
the eﬀect of performance pay on the educational performance of academics. Furthermore,
it would be interesting to see if and when extrinsic motivation starts to crowd out aca-
demics' intrinsic motivation. Another important question is how performance pay aﬀects
the selection of candidate-academics. Other possible impacts of performance pay, such as
on collaboration and network formation would make for exciting research avenues too.
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Figure 4.4.1: Conﬁdence Intervals of Year-on-Year Productivity Diﬀerences Between Treat-
ment and Control Group
(a)
(b)
The ﬁgures depict the coeﬃcient estimates and corresponding 90% conﬁdence intervals of the interactions of a treat-
ment dummy and year dummies in a regression of weighted publications in t on year dummies and year*treatment
interactions, controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The dependent variable is the weighted number of publications
of academic i in ﬁeld f and year t, lagged by average publication lag in ﬁeld f as reported in Björk and Solomon
(2013). The unit of observation is academic i. In Figure a, the sample is restricted to academics who started their
ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006, so that Treatment is 1 if an
academic starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2005 or 2006 and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or
2004 (the control group). In Figure b, the sample is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation
at a German public university in 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004, and Treatment is 1 if an academic starts his ﬁrst tenured
aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004 and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2001 or 2002 (the control group).Standard
errors are robust, clustered by individual academic.
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Figure 4.4.2: Smoothed Hazard Estimates of Switch to Performance Pay
(a)
(b)
The above ﬁgures depict the Epanechnikov kernel-density estimates of the hazard function for switching to the
performance pay scheme for academics in the top decile and bottom 90% of the average productivity distribution.
Only switches to performance pay from age-related pay are considered, where ﬁrst tenured aﬃliations after 2004
are not considered switches. The average productivity of an academic is calculated as the average impact-factor
weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1. In Figure a, an academic belongs to the top decile if his average
productivity in year t falls in the top decile of the average productivity amongst all academics at public universities
in year t. In Figure b, an academic belongs to the top decile if his average productivity in 2005 falls in the top
decile of the average productivity amongst all academics at public universities in 2005.
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Figure 4.4.3: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Switch to Performance Pay
(a)
(b)
The above ﬁgures depict the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function for switching to the performance pay
scheme for academics in the top decile and bottom 90% of the average productivity distribution. Only switches to
performance pay from age-related pay are considered, where ﬁrst tenured aﬃliations after 2004 are not considered
switches. The average productivity of an academic is calculated as the average impact-factor weighted number of
publications in t-6 to t-1. In Figure a, an academic belongs to the top decile if his average productivity in year t
falls in the top decile of the average productivity amongst all academics at public universities in year t. In Figure
b, an academic belongs to the top decile if his average productivity in 2005 falls in the top decile of the average
productivity amongst all academics at public universities in 2005.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Min Max Median
Panel A: Eﬀort Eﬀect Analysis
Weighted Publications (All academics, 1999-13) 3.783 16.709 0 1298.662 0
Weighted Publications (At public uni post'05, 1999-13) 4.737 18.910 0 1298.662 0
Weighted Publications (Tenured at public uni post'05, 1999-13) 5.235 22.038 0 1298.662 0
Weighted Publications (1st Tenure at public uni 03-06, 1999-13) 7.333 26.594 0 705.255 0
Panel B: Selection Eﬀect Regressions Total Mean Min Median Max
Switches 3376 0.090 0 0 1
Time at risk 248107 6.604 1 9 9
Notes: The unit of observation is academic i. For the baseline eﬀort eﬀect estimations, the sample is restricted to
academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006. For
the selection eﬀect estimations, the sample is restricted to academics who made tenure before 2005.
56
CHAPTER 4. EFFORT AND SELECTION EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE PAY IN
KNOWLEDGE CREATION
Table 4.2: Unconditional Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences: Means of Weighted Number of Publi-
cations by First Tenure Cohort and Before/After Reform Period
Treatment group Control group Diﬀerence
(ﬁrst tenured '05/'06) (first tenured '03/'04)
Before reform ('99-'04) 4.693 4.362 0.331
(0.377) (0.256) (0.455)
After reform ('05-'13) 10.667 8.794 1.873**
(0.796) (0.525) (0.953)
Diﬀerence 5.974*** 4.432*** 1.542**
(0.540) (0.360) (0.649)
(a) Experiment of Interest
Treatment group Control group Diﬀerence
(first tenured '03/'04) (ﬁrst tenured '01/'02)
Before reform ('99-'04) 4.362 4.196 0.166
(0.256) (0.236) (0.348)
After reform ('05-'13) 8.794 7.931 0.863
(0.525) (0.509) (0.731)
Diﬀerence 4.432*** 3.734*** 0.697
(0.360) (0.362) (0.511)
(b) Placebo Experiment
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The table shows the means, diﬀerences in means and
corresponding standard errors of the impact factor weighted number of publications of the treatment and control
group before and after the performance pay reform. These means and diﬀerences in means are derived from a pooled
OLS regression of the lagged, weighted number of publications of academics on a constant, a treatment dummy, a
post dummy (that is 1 for the years after the reform (2005-2013), and 0 before) and a treatment*post interaction
term, where the number of publications of academic i in ﬁeld f and year t are lagged by the average publication lag
in ﬁeld f as reported in Björk and Solomon (2013). The before-reform period spans 6 years (1999-2004), the period
after the reform spans 9 years (2005-2013). In Panel A, the sample is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst
tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006 with the treatment group comprising
academics who ﬁrst made tenure in 2005 or 2006, while academics who ﬁrst made tenure in 2003 or 2004 make up
the control group. In Panel B, the sample is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a
German public university in 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004, with the (placebo) treatment group comprising academics
who ﬁrst made tenure in 2003 or 2004, while academics who ﬁrst made tenure in 2001 or 2002 make up the (placebo)
control group. Standard errors are clustered by individual academic and reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.3: Baseline Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ and Pre-Trend Test
Baseline Pre-trend Test
Dep. Var.: Weighted Number of Publications 1_a 1_b 2_a 2_b
Linear Time Trend 0.721*** 0.780***
(0.056) (0.069)
Post_t-3 (1 if year≥ 2002,0 otherwise) 0.548*** -1.012***
(0.176) (0.225)
Post_t-2 (1 if year≥ 2003,0 otherwise) 0.822*** 0.042
(0.189) (0.196)
Post_t-1 (1 if year≥ 2004,0 otherwise) 0.297 -0.483**
(0.192) (0.205)
Post (1 if year≥ 2005,0 otherwise) 4.432*** -0.975** 3.362*** -0.538
(0.360) (0.411) (0.343) (0.372)
Post_t-3 * Treat. (1st tenured '05/'06) 0.543** 0.543**
(0.275) (0.275)
Post_t-2 * Treatment -0.186 -0.186
(0.328) (0.328)
Post_t-1 * Treatment 0.301 0.301
(0.357) (0.357)
Post * Treatment 1.542** 1.542** 1.144* 1.144*
(0.649) (0.649) (0.635) (0.635)
N 3717 3717 3717 3717
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The unit of observation is academic i. The sample
is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2003, 2004,
2005 or 2006. The dependent variable is the impact-factor weighted number of publications of academic i in ﬁeld
f and year t, lagged by average publication lag in ﬁeld f as reported in Björk and Solomon (2013). Post is 0
before 2005 and 1 thereafter, and Treatment is 1 if an academic starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2005 or 2006
and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004 (the control group). Post−t − 3 is 0 before 2002 and
1 thereafter, Post−t − 2 is 0 before 2003 and 1 thereafter and Post−t − 1 is 0 before 2004 and 1 thereafter. All
regressions contain individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are robust, clustered by individual academic.
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Table 4.4: Placebo Diﬀ-in-Diﬀ and Pre-Trend Test
Trend Break DiD Pre-trend Test
Dep. Var.: Weighted Number of Publications 1_a 1_b 2_a 2_b
Linear Time Trend 0.539*** 0.594***
(0.041) (0.050)
Post_t-3 (1 if year≥ 2002,0 otherwise) 0.299* -0.889***
(0.165) (0.201)
Post_t-2 (1 if year≥ 2003,0 otherwise) 0.468** -0.126
(0.206) (0.206)
Post_t-1 (1 if year≥ 2004,0 otherwise) 0.017 -0.577***
(0.186) (0.198)
Post (1 if year≥ 2005,0 otherwise) 3.734*** -0.305 3.259*** 0.290
(0.362) (0.389) (0.335) (0.344)
Post_t-3 * Placebo-Treat. (1st tenured '03/'04) 0.249 0.249
(0.241) (0.241)
Post_t-2 * Placebo-Treatment 0.354 0.354
(0.279) (0.279)
Post_t-1 * Placebo-Treatment 0.281 0.281
(0.267) (0.267)
Post * Placebo-Treatment 0.697 0.697 0.103 0.103
(0.511) (0.511) (0.479) (0.479)
N 4270 4270 4270 4270
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The unit of observation is academic i. The sample
is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2003, 2004,
2005 or 2006. The dependent variable is the weighted number of publications of academic i in ﬁeld f and year t,
lagged by average publication lag in ﬁeld f as reported in Björk and Solomon (2013). Post is 0 before 2005 and 1
thereafter, and Treatment is 1 if an academic starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004 and 0 if he starts his
ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2001 or 2002 (the control group). Post−t−3 is 0 before 2002 and 1 thereafter, Post−t−2
is 0 before 2003 and 1 thereafter and Post−t−1 is 0 before 2004 and 1 thereafter. All regressions contain individual
ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are robust, clustered by individual academic.
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Table 4.5: Proportional Hazard Model
1_a 1_b 2_a 2_b
Average Productivity 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.092*** -0.092***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -4.304*** -0.015 -4.304*** -0.015
(0.027) (0.160) (0.027) (0.160)
ln (ρ) -0.006 0.145*** -0.003 0.148***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
N 37571 37562 37571 37562
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The unit of observation is academic i. The duration
under consideration is the time until switch to performance pay, and academics are considered at risk of switching
after they have made tenure. The average productivity of an academic is calculated as the average impact-factor
weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1. In columns 1a and 1b, the average productivity in year t is used,
while in columns 2a and 2b the average productivity in 2005 is used as covariate. The age variable is equal to an
author's self-reported age if known, and equal to a synthetic age otherwise. The synthetic age is calculated using
the average age at habilitation and start of academic career. Standard errors are robust, clustered by individual
academic.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1:
Comparing the FOC under performance pay 4.2.7 with that under age-related pay 4.2.5,
and using that C” > 0 and f1 > 0, it follows that equilibrium eﬀort under performance pay
is greater than under age-related pay if the marginal pay-oﬀ from eﬀort is greater under
performance pay than under age-related pay. That is, if:
[
rp + bgεj−εi (4fij (ep∗; θ))
]
> ra (4.4.1)
This condition is met because, by assumption, rp > ra, b > 0 and g (εj − εi) > 0 every-
where on its support. Because I solve for subgame perfect equilibria, and because the
optimisation problem in the eﬀort stage is the same in each period30, the equilibrium eﬀort
levels deﬁned in 4.2.5 and 4.2.7 also give ﬁrst period equilibrium eﬀort. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
I ﬁrst derive the sorting behaviour of academics in period 2, followed by that in period
1 to prove the statements regarding the heterogeneity of the selection eﬀect across ages.
The statement regarding the overall selection eﬀect immediately follows from this.
In period 2, an academic's expected life-time equilibrium utility when working under the
age-related pay scheme is given by:
E
[
Uai,2
(
ea∗i,2; θi
)]
= wa2 + r
af
(
ea∗i,2; θi
)− C (ea∗i,2) (4.4.2)
while his expected life-time utility when working under the performance pay scheme is
given by:
E
[
Upi,2
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)]
= wp2 + r
pf
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)
+ bGεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗2 ; θ))− C (ep∗i,2) (4.4.3)
By 4.4.1, the marginal pay-oﬀ from eﬀort is larger under performance pay than under
age-related pay at any given eﬀort level. Furthermore, from proposition 1 we have that
ep∗i,2 > e
a∗
i,2. It then follows from the second order condition 4.2.8 that the portion of utility
that varies with eﬀort is greater under performance pay than under age-related pay. That
30Only the age-related basic wage is diﬀerent in the ﬁrst period, but because this does not depend on
eﬀort, the optimisation problem with respect to eﬀort is the same.
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is
rpf
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)
+ bGεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗2 ; θ))− C (ep∗i,2) > raf (ea∗i,2; θi)− C (ea∗i,2) (4.4.4)
However, in period 2 the basic wage under age-related pay is larger than that under per-
formance pay (wa2 > w
p
2), so that the total expected utility under performance pay might
be larger or smaller than under age-related pay.
By the envelope theorem and the assumptions that f1 > 0, rp > ra, b > 0 and
g (εj − εi) > 0 everywhere on its support, we have that equilibrium utility is larger for
higher ability academics under both pay schemes:
∂E
[
Upi,2
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)]
∂θi
=
[
rp + bgεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗2 ; θ))] ∂f
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)
∂θi
> 0
and
∂E
[
Uai,2
(
ea∗i,2; θi
)]
∂θi
= ra
∂f
(
ea∗i,2; θi
)
∂θi
> 0
Furthermore, it follows from 4.4.1 that:
∂E
[
Upi,2
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)]
∂θi
>
∂E
[
Uai,2
(
ea∗i,2; θi
)]
∂θi
(4.4.5)
Deﬁne θ02 to be the ability level at which E
[
Upi,2
(
ep∗i,2; θ
0
2
)]
= E
[
Uai,2
(
ea∗i,2; θ
0
2
)]
, so that
academics with ability θ02 are indiﬀerent between the age-related pay scheme and the per-
formance pay scheme. By 4.4.5, it must be that academics with ability level θ > θ02 prefer
performance pay to age-related pay, and hence self-select into the performance pay scheme.
Then if θ02 > θ, only relatively high ability academics select into performance pay. The
condition θ02 > θ is met if the diﬀerence in basic wage between the age-related pay scheme
and the performance pay scheme is suﬃciently large, in particular, if the following holds:
wa2 − wp2 > rpf
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)
+ bGεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗2 ; θ))− C (ep∗i,2)− [raf (ea∗i,2; θi)− C (ea∗i,2)]
(4.4.6)
In period 1, an academic's expected life-time equilibrium utility when working under the
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age-related pay scheme in both periods is given by:
E
[
Uai,1
(
ea∗i,1; θi
)]
= wa1 + r
af
(
ea∗i,1; θi
)−C (ea∗i,1)+ δ [wa2 + raf (ea∗i,2; θi)− C (ea∗i,2)] (4.4.7)
while his expected lifetime utility when working under the performance pay scheme in both
periods is given by:
E
[
Upi,1
(
ep∗i,1; θi
)]
= w¯p1 + r
pf
(
ep∗i,1; θi
)
+ bGεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗1 ; θ))− C (ep∗i,1)+
δ
[
wp2 + r
pf
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)
+ bGεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗2 ; θ))− C (ep∗i,2)] (4.4.8)
In a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, ea∗i,1 = e
a∗
i,2and e
p∗
i,1 = e
p∗
i,2. From
4.4.4, we therefore have that the portion of utility that varies with eﬀort is greater un-
der performance pay than under age-related pay in both period 1 and period 2. On the
other hand, the diﬀerence between the basic wage in the age-related pay system and the
performance pay system is larger positive in period 2 than in period 1. Period 2 util-
ity is however discounted by δ. Denoting the diﬀerence in the portion of utility that
varies with eﬀort between the age-related and performance pay scheme by 4u2 (e∗2; θi) ≡
rpf
(
ep∗i,2; θi
)
+bGεj−εi
(4fij (ep∗2 ; θ))−C (ep∗i,2)−[raf (ea∗i,2; θi)− C (ea∗i,2)] = 4u1 (e∗1; θi),
we have that the diﬀerence in expected utility between working under the performance pay
scheme and working under the age-related pay scheme in both periods is:
E
[
Upi,1
(
ep∗i,1; θi
)]
−E [Uai,1 (ea∗i,1; θi)] = w¯p1 −wa1 +4u1 (e∗1; θi) + δ [wp2 − wa2 +4u2 (e∗2; θi)]
(4.4.9)
An academic prefers to switch to the performance pay scheme at the beginning of
period 1 if 4.4.9 is positive. Let θ01 be the ability level at which E
[
Upi,1
(
ep∗i,1; θ
0
1
)]
=
E
[
Uai,1
(
ea∗i,1; θ
0
1
)]
. Academics with ability θ01 are indiﬀerent between switching from the
age-related pay scheme to the performance pay scheme in period 1. By deﬁnition of
θ02 we have that w
a
2 − wp2 + 4u2
(
e∗2; θ02
)
= 0. Because 4u1 (e∗1; θi) = 4u2 (e∗2; θi) and
w¯p1 − wa1 > wp2 − wa2 , and using 4.4.5 it then follows that θ01 < θ02. Therefore, there are
academics who prefer to switch to performance pay in period 1, whose ability is not large
enough for them to prefer switching in period 2. If θ01 > θ, it is still true that only rela-
tively higher ability academics switch to performance pay in period 1, but amongst these
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young academics there are some with ability θ01 < θ < θ
0
2, who do prefer to switch when
they are young (in period 1), but who would not switch when they are older (in period
2). Incidentally, this also implies that academics who do not switch to performance pay
when they are young (in period 1), will not switch in period 2 either, since they must have
ability θ < θ01 < θ
0
2. Finally because academics cannot switch back to age-related pay
once they are in the performance pay scheme, we do not have to analyse the scenario in
which academics select into the performance pay scheme in period 1, then switch back to
age-related pay in period 2, when the basic wage diﬀerence between age related pay and
performance pay is relatively larger. QED
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Appendix B
Table 4.7: Year-on-Year Diﬀerences in Academic Productivity
Interaction-Year Experiment of Interest Placebo Experiment
2000 -0.246 0.200
(0.271) (0.253)
2001 0.177 0.116
(0.304) (0.262)
2002 0.520 0.354
(0.329) (0.293)
2003 0.334 0.708**
(0.402) (0.343)
2004 0.635 0.989***
(0.462) (0.380)
2005 0.967* 0.792*
(0.510) (0.469)
2006 1.407** 0.672
(0.692) (0.572)
2007 1.352** 0.378
(0.687) (0.613)
2008 1.429** 0.282
(0.664) (0.607)
2009 1.634* 1.071
(0.935) (0.734)
2010 1.285 1.166
(0.937) (0.747)
2011 1.578 2.001**
(1.016) (0.791)
2012 2.680** 1.951**
(1.365) (0.980)
2013 3.680*** 1.514*
(1.322) (0.919)
N 3717 4270
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The unit of observation is academic i. The table
reports the coeﬃcients of the interactions of a treatment dummy and year dummies in a regression of weighted
publications in t on year dummies and year*treatment interactions, controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The
dependent variable is the weighted number of publications of academic i in ﬁeld f and year t, lagged by average
publication lag in ﬁeld f as reported in Björk and Solomon (2013). In column 1, the sample is restricted to
academics who started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2003, 2004, 2005 or 2006, so
that Treatment is 1 if an academic starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2005 or 2006 and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst
tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004 (the control group). In column 2, the sample is restricted to academics who
started their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation at a German public university in 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008, and Treatment is
1 if an academic starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2007 or 2008 and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in
2005 or 2006 (the control group). In column 3, the sample is restricted to academics who started their ﬁrst tenured
aﬃliation at a German public university in 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004, and Treatment is 1 if an academic starts his
ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2003 or 2004 and 0 if he starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation in 2001 or 2002 (the control
group). Standard errors are robust, clustered by individual academic.
66
CHAPTER 4. EFFORT AND SELECTION EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE PAY IN
KNOWLEDGE CREATION
Table 4.8: Heterogeneous Hazard Rates by Age - Interactions
Weibull Model
1a 1b
Average Productivity 0.025*** 0.034***
(0.007) (0.010)
Age -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.004) (0.004)
Average Productivity*Age -0.0004*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.133 -0.129
(0.163) (0.163)
ln(p) 0.144*** 0.149***
(0.011) (0.011)
N 37562 37562
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The unit of observation is academic i. The duration
under consideration is the time until switch to performance pay, and academics are considered at risk of switching
after they have made tenure. The average productivity of an academic is calculated as the average impact-factor
weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1. In the a columns the average productivity in year t is used, while
in the b columns the average productivity in 2005 is used as covariate. Standard errors are robust, clustered by
individual academic.
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5 Lone Stars or Constellations? The
Impact of Performance Pay on
Matching Assortativeness in Academia
5.1 Introduction
Performance related pay is widespread and becoming increasingly more prevalent. Using
PSID data, Lemieux et al. (2009) show that the incidence of performance pay jobs among
US salaried workers was less than 45% in the late 1970s and increased to almost 60% at
the end of the 1990s. While the eﬀects of performance pay on on-the-job performance and
sorting are widely studied1, the eﬀect performance pay may have on team composition
in general, and the degree of matching assortativeness in particular, has not been studied
extensively. The level of matching assortativeness may however greatly aﬀect total produc-
tivity in sectors and countries. In his seminal O-Ring Theory paper, Kremer (1993) for
instance shows that if production is complementary in worker skill, workers will be matched
positive assortatively by skill; output and wages increase sharply in skill; and incomes dif-
fer greatly between countries. In this chapter I study the eﬀect of performance pay on
matching assortativeness and provide empirical evidence that performance pay increases
positive assortative matching by productivity if there are positive productivity spillovers,
using the introduction of performance pay in German academia as a natural experiment.
I present a simple matching model that makes precise how performance related pay af-
fects matching assortativeness. I model the academic job market as a stochastic hedonic
coalition formation problem in which an academic's utility from a coalition depends on a
systematic and an idiosyncratic component. The systematic component depends on the
1See Lazear and Oyer (2012), Bloom and Reenen (2011), Oyer and Schaefer (2011), Lazear and Shaw
(2007) for an overview of the literature.
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productivity of the academics in a coalition and increases in own and partner's productiv-
ity to represent spillover eﬀects. As in Choo and Siow (2006) and Siow (2009)'s stochastic
Becker (1973) model, the idiosyncratic component captures the deviation of an academic's
utility from the systematic component of the utility from a given coalition and reconciles
observing matchings that are not perfect positive assortative matchings by productivity
in the academic job market with the theory. In the model, the idiosyncratic component
captures a worker's personal preferences regarding colleagues and workplace, and it causes
matching to become less positively assortative. This reduces total output if the academic
output function exhibits increasing diﬀerences. The introduction of performance pay in-
creases the utility from academic output and thus increases positive assortative matching
by productivity again. Moreover, this increase is larger if complementarities are stronger.
I test this hypothesis empirically in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework, using the intro-
duction of performance pay in German academia as a natural experiment and the strength
of complementarities in academic ﬁelds as a measure of treatment intensity.
Any appointment after the implementation of the reform necessarily falls under the new
performance pay scheme (Detmer and Preissler 2004). The fact that this is a nationwide
reform that aﬀects all agents in an entire sector means that agents cannot simply opt into
or out of either one of the pay schemes by moving to a diﬀerent employer2. Academics who
already had a tenured position can of course avoid the new pay scheme by staying put, and
any (aspiring) academics can avoid the performance pay scheme by leaving academia, but
any academic aﬃliation decisions made after the reform are made in the face of the new
performance pay scheme and therefore under the inﬂuence of incentives to match more or
less assortatively that come with performance pay.
In order to study the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness empirically, I
employ the department level data set that I derived from the individual level data set com-
prising the aﬃliations, productivity and related information of the universe of academics
in Germany which I constructed for this research project. I use this data set to study any
changes in departmental composition from before to after the reform. The combination
of a data set that encompasses an entire sector in a country and a reform that introduces
performance pay throughout the same sector in the country allows for estimation of the
eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness3.
2As long as they remain employed in the academic sector and do not move abroad.
3To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study into the German academic pay reform using a data set that
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The empirical analysis comprises of two stages. I ﬁrst assess whether positive assortative
matching increases post-reform and subsequently test whether it is in fact performance
pay that increases positive assortativeness matching. I do so by studying the two channels
through which departmental composition can change: hiring and ﬁring. As for hiring, I
make a distinction between junior and senior hiring, thus providing a further insight in the
anatomy of compositional changes of departments.
I ﬁnd that positive assortative matching by productivity increases post-reform: the dif-
ference in average productivity of new hires between high quality and low quality depart-
ments more than doubles, while the diﬀerence in average productivity of leavers between
high and low quality departments decreases by more than half. I then test whether per-
formance pay increases positive assortative matching if there are complementarities in
worker skill by comparing the diﬀerence in changes in positive assortativeness in ﬁelds
with weaker and stronger complementarities in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework, using
the strength of complementarity in a ﬁeld as a measure of treatment intensity. If perfor-
mance pay increases positive assortative matching, the increase should be larger in ﬁelds
in which complementarities are stronger. I ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in average productivity
of new hires between high quality and low quality departments is more than three times
larger post-reform in ﬁelds in which complementarities are stronger, so the increase in pos-
itive assortativeness after the reform is considerably larger in high complementarity ﬁelds.
This is consistent with performance pay increasing positive assortativeness as driven by
complementarities in worker productivity.
I control for alternative explanations, such as pre-existing trends and diﬀerential hiring
budgets and show that the results are robust. Because controlling for a department's hiring
budget with a contemporaneous hiring budget variable comes with the risk of omitted
variable bias, I construct a proxy for the hiring budget that is historically determined and
plausibly exogenous. Since a German university's personnel budget varies relatively little
from one year to the next (Jongbloed 2009) and academics are mandated to retire at 65
(Mohr 2007, Bundesbeamtengesetz 1985), and because academics who are about to retire
earn the highest salary under the old, age-related pay scheme, if a lot of academics retire
in a given year, a larger share of the personnel budget is available for hiring. A university's
hiring budget thus varies with the number of academics who retire in a year and this
encompasses the universe of academics in Germany.
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variation is historically determined and plausibly exogenous.
To my knowledge this study is one of the ﬁrst to investigate the eﬀect of performance pay
on the level of assortative matching in the presence of complementarities in worker skill.
Bandiera et al. (2013) study the eﬀect of team-based incentives on matching assortativeness
in teams within a ﬁrm employing manual labourers. This chapter studies the eﬀect of
individual pay for performance incentives on the assortativeness of matching into ﬁrms
(universities) in an entire sector in a country where the workers involved are knowledge
workers and the production function is thought to exhibit complementarities in worker
skill.
Studying the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness in the context of
academia is interesting and relevant for a number of reasons. Various papers show that
there can be signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects in academia, not only for co-authors (Borjas and
Doran 2014, Oettl 2012, Waldinger 2012, Azoulay et al. 2010) and PhD's (Waldinger 2012,
2010), but also for co-located colleagues who work on related subjects (Agrawal et al.
2014)4. Furthermore, by studying the eﬀect of performance pay on assortativeness in
academia, this chapter aims to add to the literature on the organisation of knowledge
creation (Grigoriou and Rothaermel 2014, Phelps et al. 2012, Jones 2009, Wuchty et al.
2007, Singh 2005, Audretsch and Feldman 2004, 1996, Jaﬀe et al. 1993) and the debate
on university governance (cf. Haeck and Verboven 2012, Aghion et al. 2010, Belenzon and
Schankerman 2009, Lach and Schankerman 2008, 2004) in particular. Given that human
capital organisation is of primary importance in knowledge creation, academia seems an
important place to study the organisation of labour and management practices. Human
capital and knowledge creation, and in particular human capital spillovers have, in turn,
been understood to play a central role in economic growth since the models of Romer (1990)
and (1986) and Lucas (1990) and (1988). Finally, studying matching in an entire sector in
a country, as I do here, is relevant not just for the eﬀect matching assortativeness may have
on total output, but also the diﬀerent distribution of output and production factors that
a change in matching assortativeness implies. This distribution may aﬀect welfare directly
too and academia is a particularly relevant example of a sector in which both the total
output and the distribution of production factors and output matter for total welfare. A
4Kim et al. (2009) however show that the externality of productive academic colleagues has diminished
over the last three decades of the 21st century and even disappeared in the 1990s in the ﬁelds of
economics and ﬁnance.
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greater total scientiﬁc output may boost technological progress, so to the extent that there
are positive productivity spillovers5 in academia, this calls for a concentration of the most
productive academics. On the other hand, we may also care about, for instance, providing
good scientiﬁc education to many people, all over a country. This requires a more even
distribution of high quality academics across a country. Hence if performance-related pay
aﬀects the matching assortativeness of academics (or productive agents in general) and
hence their distribution, this may aﬀect welfare in more ways than the direct eﬀect of
(potentially) increasing productivity. It is therefore especially relevant to study the eﬀect
of performance related pay on matching assortativeness in sectors, such as academia, in
which the distribution of the production factors (and output) is an important determinant
of welfare as well.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows; I present the theoretical framework in
the next section, describe the data in section 3 and discuss the empirical results in section
4. Section 5 concludes.
5.2 Model
In this section I present a simple one-sided matching model of team (in the context of
the chapter: department) formation that makes precise the eﬀects of performance related
pay on matching assortativeness. In this model, whenever two academics are matched,
they form a department and are considered active in academia. An academic who remains
unmatched is considered to leave academia. This academic job market is akin to the
roommate market introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), in which a set of students is
partitioned into pairs of roommates and singletons. As remarked by Klaus et al. (2010),
these markets are instances of hedonic coalition formation problems where coalitions are
restricted to comprise at most two agents.
Most roommate market and more general hedonic coalition formation problems are de-
scribed by deterministic models (see e.g. Hajduková 2006). I will however model the
academic job market as a stochastic hedonic coalition formation problem in which an aca-
demic's utility from a coalition depends on a systematic and an idiosyncratic component.
The systematic component depends on the productivity of the academics in a coalition.
As in Choo and Siow (2006) and Siow (2009)'s stochastic Becker (1973) model, the id-
5Speciﬁcally, if the output function is supermodular.
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iosyncratic component captures the deviation of an academic's utility from the systematic
component of the utility from a given coalition. This idiosyncratic component allows for
observing matchings that are not perfect positive assortative matchings by productivity in
the academic job market.6 Moreover, it allows for increases in the level of positive as-
sortative matching by productivity post-reform if the introduction of performance related
pay increases the utility from the systematic component.
This model is similar to that presented in Bandiera et al. (2013) in that it models
team-formation as a one-sided matching model without transferable utility. In that paper
however, the utility of agents depends positively on their partner's productivity due to
team-based incentive schemes and because of friendship ties, whereas in this chapter it
depends positively on partner's productivity regardless of their relationship and due to
positive spillovers in the production function. The model in Bandiera et al. (2013) also
includes a component that does not depend on agents' productivity, but in contrast to the
idiosyncratic component in this chapter, theirs is deterministic and depends on friendship
ties. The idiosyncratic component considered here is stochastic and more general in that
it may diﬀer within pairs of agents so as to allow for any kind of unobservable preferences
regarding potential matching partners' identity7.
5.2.1 Model Set-Up - Baseline
Let there be m academics indexed 1, ...,m. Academic i has productivity type θi, which
is a random and independent draw from θ ∼ U [θ, θ] , θ = 1. I assume that academics'
productivity is common knowledge, because in the time period considered for the empir-
ical analysis important indicators of an academic's productivity, such as educational and
professional background, publication record and other academic achievements are readily
available online for most academics. Let a faculty consist of two academics, so that when
i and j are matched, they form a faculty and work in academia. If i remains unmatched,
he leaves academia. The utility of academic i is given by:
6A deﬁnition of a positive assortative matching in the context of the one-sided matching model considered
here is given shortly.
7This is because aﬃliation decisions are likely inﬂuenced by more than just friendship ties, such as the
geographical location of a department, and preferences may be asymmetric.
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ui|j =

αf (θi | θj) + wi|j if i is matched with academic j
ui if i is unmatched
(5.2.1)
where f (θi | θj) is the productivity of i when he is matched with j, α > 0 is a weighing
constant that captures academics' valuation of this productivity (for instance capturing
intrinsic motivation) and wi|j is the wage i is paid when matched with j. Pre-reform,
every academic receives the same, ﬂat wage at a given age irrespective of the identity or
productivity of his matching partner, so wi|j = w¯i. For now, let every agent also have the
same outside option, ui = u, ∀i.
I assume that the production function f (θi | θj) increases in own and matching part-
ner's productivity. This increase in partner's productivity represents spillovers between
academics and they are larger, the larger is the increase in output with respect to part-
ner's productivity8. Speciﬁcally, let f1 =
∂f(θi|θj)
∂θi
> 0 and f2 =
∂f(θi|θj)
∂θj
> 0. The model
is intentionally kept suﬃciently general to allow for spillovers that are not restricted to
co-authorships, but simply occur between academics who are working in the same depart-
ment.
Deﬁne the matching (or assignment) function µ to be a 1-to-1 correspondence from
{1, ...,m} → {1, ...,m} of order 2, so that:
µ (i) = j if i is matched with academic j (5.2.2)
Matchings are symmetric: if µ (i) = j then also µ (j) = i . For ease of notation, I will use
the shorthand µij to denote a matching of i with j, where µij = 1 if µ (i) = j. A matching
µ is feasible if every academic is matched to one and only one academic (possibly himself),
so that
∑
j
µij = 1. A matching µ is individually rational if no academic prefers working
outside of academia to being in a department with his matching partner in µ, that is if
ui|µ(i) = αf
(
θi | θµ(i)
)
+wi ≥ u,∀i ∈ {1, ..,m}. A matching µ cannot be improved upon if
there are no two academics i, j such that
αf (θi | θj) ≥ αf
(
θi | θµ(i)
)
8Formally, academic output function f (. | .) exhibits stronger complementarities than f˜ (. | .) if f (θi | θj)-
f (θi | θk) > f˜ (θi | θj)− f˜ (θi | θk) for θj > θk
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and
αf (θj | θi) ≥ αf
(
θj | θµ(j)
)
with at least one inequality strict (i.e. no coalition can improve upon the allocation; no
blocking pairs exist).
Following Gale and Shapley (1962), I deﬁne a matching µ to be stable if no academic
or pair of academics wants to deviate from (or block) it. More precisely, and following
Chiappori et al. (2014), a matching of academics µ is stable if it is feasible and cannot
be improved upon. A matching µ is optimal if it maximises total surplus, such that∑
i ui|µ(i) ≥
∑
i ui|µ′(i),∀µ′ (i).
Proposition 1 (Baseline matching): The baseline model has a unique stable match-
ing, which matches the highest productivity type with the next highest productivity type
academic, and so on. This stable matching is optimal. If f (θi | θj) exhibits increasing
diﬀerences this is the unique optimal matching9. (Proof in Appendix A)
I will refer to this matching µ˜ as a maximal positive assortative matching of the academic
job market, where the deﬁnition of such a matching coincides with that of the matching
µ˜. That is, I will refer to a matching µ as a maximal positive assortative matching of the
academic job market if it matches the most productive academic with the second highest
productivity academic, the third with the fourth, and so on, for all academics and their
productivity adjacent match partners whose utility from such a match is at least as large
as the utility from the outside option. Put diﬀerently, a matching µ is a maximal positive
assortative matching if the (average) diﬀerence in productivity rank between two matched
academics who are active in academia is 1.
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that the core of two-sided one-to-one games (the mar-
riage market) is non-empty, and that their proposed "deferred-acceptance" algorithm yields
not only a stable, but an optimal assignment of agents. They also show that a stable match-
ing may not exist in the one-sided roommate matching problem without transferable utility.
From Shapley and Shubik (1971) we know that for bipartite matchings with transferable
utility the set of stable allocations also coincides with the core, so that a stable matching µ
is an optimal matching. This result does not necessarily carry over to one-sided matching
9The function f (θi | θj) exhibits increasing differences if, for any θ′i > θi and θ
′
j > θj we have that
f
(
θ
′
i | θ
′
j
)
− f
(
θi | θ′j
)
≥ f
(
θ
′
i | θj
)
− f (θi | θj)
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problems with transferable utility, in which surplus-maximising matchings may not be sta-
ble (Chiappori et al. 2014). Proposition 1 shows that the baseline model presented here of
one-sided team formation does have a unique stable matching and, moreover, that this sta-
ble matching is optimal too. Furthermore, if the matching production function f (θi | θj)
is supermodular, the unique stable matching is also the unique optimal matching. Hence if
the academic output function exhibits increasing diﬀerences, the maximal positive assor-
tative matching µ˜ uniquely maximises total academic output. A distortion of the model
that renders µ˜ unstable therefore reduces total academic output10. In the next section
I introduce such a distortion. On the other hand, an innovation that counters the eﬀect
of the distortion might increase the probability that µ˜ is stable again and total academic
output maximised11. I will show below that performance pay is such an innovation.
5.2.2 Baseline with Noise - Pre-Reform
Before the academic pay reform, professorial wages only increased with age and did not vary
with performance. Academics might still derive utility from being more productive (any
form of intrinsic motivation, a greater likelihood to attract research funds from external
sources, possible bonuses for C4 professors12, etc.), but this beneﬁt is not related to an
academic's salary. The α in the model captures this non-monetary beneﬁt from own
academic output. Furthermore, I assume that an academic's utility when matched does
not only depend on his productivity utility αf (θi | θj), but also on whether i gets along
well with j, the location of the faculty of i and j, etc. This is represented by a noise term
νij that represents the (dis)utility to i from matching with j. For ease of exposition, let
f2 =
∂f(θi|θj)
∂θj
= c2 > 0 (assumption 1). I will make the following assumptions regarding
the distribution of the idiosyncratic noise term:
• assumption 2.a13 : νij are random and independent draws from a symmetric and
10In expectation, if no stable matching exists
11If the academic output function exhibits increasing diﬀerences
12Cf. footnote 1 in the previous chapter.
13Choo and Siow (2006) and Siow (2009) assume an extreme value distribution for the noise term in
their stochastic Becker model. Furthermore, their noise term is speciﬁc for the type of possible match
partner only, and does not vary with the speciﬁc identity of the potential matching partner. This speciﬁc
distribution allows them to derive neat quasi-demand and supply equations for agent types using results
from McFadden (1974), and, in turn testable implications for the empirical distribution of matches.
The identiﬁcation in this chapter however only derives from the change in pay scheme, which in turn
changes the utility from own academic productivity. In order to analyse the eﬀect of performance pay
on matching assortativeness, I derive the change in probability that the baseline matching µ˜ is stable.
For this I need a symmetric, mean zero distribution and, later on, will assume a uniform distribution
to make the analysis more tractable.
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mean zero distribution g(.), with support
[−αc2 (θ¯ − θ) , αc2 (θ¯ − θ)] and pdf G(.)
• assumption 2.b : νij is independent from θi, θj
Proposition 2 (Pre-reform matching): In the academic job market with noise, a
less than maximal positive assortative matching (stable or not) arises with non-zero
probability14. This probability is smaller if complementarities are stronger15. (Proof in
Appendix A)
Here, a less than maximal positive assortative matching is a matching in which the
(average) diﬀerence in productivity rank of matched academics active in academia is more
than 1. More generally, I will consider a matching µ to be more positively assortative
than a matching µ′ if the average diﬀerence in productivity rank of matched academics
active in academia is smaller in µ than in µ′.
In the next section I analyse if the introduction of performance pay can reduce the
probability with which a less than maximal positive assortative matching arises and thus, if
f (θi | θj) exhibits increasing diﬀerences, reduce the probability with which total academic
output is less than maximal.
5.2.3 Baseline with Noise, Bonuses and Tournaments - Post-Reform
The academic pay reform introduces three measures that change an academic's utility from
working in academia. First, the reform introduces performance bonuses that can be paid
as wage supplements to attract outside professors or prevent professors from wandering
oﬀ. Second, after the reform bonuses for research or educational performance can be won
in on-the-job tournaments. Third, professors can be paid a supplement from third-party
awarded funds for research or teaching projects for the duration of such projects since the
reform.16
The eﬀect of the on-the-job tournaments on an academic's utility and consequent match-
ing is ambiguous. The tournaments increase the beneﬁt of working with an academic whose
productivity is less than one's own, as this would increase the probability that one would
14Where, in the case when no stable matching exists, I use the set of absorbing matchings as solution
concept (as suggested by Klaus et al. (2010)).
15Complementarities are stronger if ∂f (θi | θj) /∂θj = c2 is larger
16As mentioned in Chapter 2, the reform also introduced bonuses for taking management roles or tasks
(BMBF 2002). Since these bonuses are not related to academic (research) output, they do not aﬀect
the matching process.
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win the tournament. But this also means that the tournament increases the disutility from
working with someone whose productivity is greater than one's own. Solving for the eﬀect
of the tournaments on the stability of the baseline stable matching µ˜ analytically would
require making strong assumptions about the size of the tournament prizes relative to the
size of the spillover eﬀects and proportionality constant α. I do not know of stylised facts
that could inform any such assumptions and so remain agnostic about the eﬀect possibly
going either way.
The attraction bonuses change an academic's utility from working in academia in two
ways. Firstly, receiving a greater bonus to become part of a faculty (match with another
academic) simply increases the utility an academic derives from being part of that faculty.
If the amount of money a faculty (a pair of academics) has to spend on bonuses does not
vary in a systematic way with the productivity of the academics, this simply comprises
another noise term. A faculty that has a greater budget to spend on attraction bonuses
should be able to attract better academics.
Secondly, the prospect of future attraction bonuses should increase the utility people
derive from academic productivity, since a greater productivity now increases the chances
that an academic will be oﬀered a (higher) attraction bonus to take up a position at a
(new) university or a (higher) retention bonus if the academic is already aﬃliated with
a university and that university does not want to lose the academic. Similarly, a greater
productivity increases the chances that an academic will continue to receive his attraction
or retention bonus if this is not awarded permanently.
The supplements that professors can get paid from third-party awarded funding should
also increase the utility academics derive from academic productivity if a greater produc-
tivity increases the chances that an academic is awarded such funding. This increase in the
utility derived from academic productivity could be captured by an increase in the weigh-
ing constant α in the model. In turn, this should increase any academic's preference for
matching with a high productivity academic, since working in the same faculty as a high
productivity academic increases own academic output if there are positive productivity
spillovers.
Proposition 3 (Post-reform matching): If there are spillovers between academics
and if the utility from academic productivity is greater post-reform (i.e. if αpost > αpre), it
is more likely that the maximal positive assortative matching is stable, and less likely that
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any matching that is a less than maximal positive assortative matching is stable. Hence, if
there is a stable matching post-reform, it is more likely to be a more positively assortative
matching. This eﬀect is stronger when complementarities are larger. (Proof in Appendix
A)
Proposition 3 tells us that performance pay increases the probability that the maximal
positive assortative matching is stable if there are positive spillover eﬀects, and hence that
academic output is maximised if the academic output function exhibits increasing diﬀer-
ences. Moreover, the likelihood that the maximal positive assortative matching is stable
again is larger if complementarities are stronger. This implies that we can test whether
performance pay increases positive assortative matching when there are positive spillovers
by comparing the change in assortativeness upon the introduction of performance pay be-
tween ﬁelds with diﬀerent complementarity strength. Fields in which complementarities
are stronger should see a larger increase in positive assortativeness if performance pay
increases positive assortative matching. I test this hypothesis in the next section.
5.3 Data Description
For this project I use the department level panel data set that I constructed for this project,
which encompasses the 89 German public universities between 1999 and 2013. For each
department, the panel provides the total number of tenured professors in a given year,
the number of new hires into tenured positions, the number of academics already aﬃliated
and in tenured positions, and the number of tenured professors that retire in a given year.
The panel further contains the number of new hires who start their ﬁrst tenured position
at a public university (junior hires) and the number of new hires who move from another
tenured aﬃliation (senior hires) and the number of people who leave a tenured position.
Apart from information regarding the size of these categories of academics, the department
panel also contains productivity variables, most notably average productivity, as well as
a proxy for the hiring budget of departments. I give a precise deﬁnition and describe the
construction of all these variables in the next section.
As explained in the Data chapter, I focus on academics who held a tenured position at a
German public university between 1999 and 2013 for the purposes of this research because
they are the ones who qualify for performance bonuses in the performance pay scheme and
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they have a comparable research output.
All in all, the data set used for this chapter covers all departments in all the research
active public universities in Germany. The ﬁnal data set contains 1068 departments in 89
universities over 15 years17.
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The main dependent variable for the empirical analysis is the average productivity of new
hires of a department. I deﬁne the average productivity of an academic as the impact
factor-weighted number of publications in years t-6 through t-1 divided by the number
of years he was academically active in this same period18. The average productivity of
new hires has a mean19,20 of 3.68 and a standard deviation of 8.68 (cf. Table 5.1). New
hires that start their ﬁrst tenured position (junior hires) in the sample period have a mean
average productivity of 3.67, with a standard deviation of 8.86, while academics who move
from one tenured position to another (senior hires) have a mean average productivity of 5.22
with a standard deviation of 14.27. The mean average productivity in year t of academics
who were already aﬃliated with a department in t-1 (labelled aﬃliates) is 2.56, while
the mean average productivity of those that leave their aﬃliation at some point in the
sample period (the leavers) is 3.56. The mean of the departmental average of the average
productivity of all academics aﬃliated with a given department (new hires and aﬃliates)
is 2.58.
The most important explanatory variables for this study are the quality of a department
and the hiring budget. I use the pre-sample mean of the average productivity of tenured
academics aﬃliated with a department as a measure of the quality of a department21. The
mean of the department quality variable is 2.22 and the standard deviation is 4.15. I use
the number of tenured academics who retire from a certain university in a given year as
a proxy for the hiring budget of that university (I explain why I do this and argue that
this is a reasonable proxy for the hiring budget in the next section). The average of this
17Of the 15 years I have data for, I use 6 for my baseline sample (2001-2006) to abstract from eﬀort eﬀects.
18Here, academically active means having passed all necessary qualiﬁcations and being active in academia
(both research and teaching) and/or publishing articles.
19Note that this is a triple mean: it is the average productivity of new hires, averaged over all new hires
of a department, averaged over all departments of German universities
20This is the mean calculated for new hires not coming from outside Germany and for the sample period,
2001-2006, used for most of the empirical analysis below. The reason for restricting the sample period
and set of new hires is discussed in the next section.
21This is the average of the average productivity of all academics aﬃliated with a department in 1999 and
the aﬃliates in 2000
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variable is 7.28, with a standard deviation of 6.89.
The average department has 22.77 tenured academics, 21.60 of which are existing aﬃl-
iates on average, and 1.10 is a new hire. This new hire is more often an academic that
starts his ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation than one that moves from another tenured aﬃliation; the
average number of junior hires at a department in a given year is 0.78, while the average
number of senior hires is only 0.32.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
The main aim of the chapter is to test whether a steeper incentive scheme increases positive
assortative matching by productivity. Positive assortative matching can increase through
two channels: if higher quality departments are able to hire better academics and if higher
quality departments ﬁre lower quality academics. Amongst the hires of a department, we
can make a further distinction between junior and senior hires, with junior hires starting
their ﬁrst tenured aﬃliation and senior hires moving from one tenured aﬃliation to an-
other. Accordingly, I analyse how the quality of all new hires, junior and senior hires and
leavers22 changes with departmental quality before and after the reform. I ﬁrst analyse
diﬀerences in the quality of new hires and leavers before and after the reform for high
and low quality departments to establish whether positive assortativeness increases. If
performance pay increases positive assortative matching, the diﬀerence in the quality of
new hires between high and low quality departments should be larger after the reform.
Moreover, if this increase is driven by complementarities, the diﬀerence in quality of new
hires between high and low quality departments should be larger in ﬁelds in which com-
plementarities are larger. I therefore analyse diﬀerences in changes in positive assortative
matching between high and low complementarity ﬁelds as a second step. Finally, I control
for alternative explanations such as existing pre-trends and systematic diﬀerences in hiring
budget between departments.
5.4.1 Descriptive Evidence
Before starting the actual analyses, I ﬁrst need to assess if there is a large inﬂux of academics
from outside Germany and, in particular, if the inﬂux changes after the reform. To this
22I do not actually observe whether an academic gets ﬁred or leaves out of own free will, so I will refer to
academics who (are made to) leave a department as leavers in what follows.
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end, I show the number of new hires coming from outside Germany as a percentage of total
new hires in a given year for the sample period (2001 - 2006) in Figure 5.5.1. The mean
percentage of new hires from outside Germany over this period is 6.14. Importantly, there
is no marked increase in the percentage of new hires coming from outside Germany after
performance pay is implemented in 2005. Nevertheless, I restrict my sample to exclude
new hires attracted from outside Germany for the empirical analyses below in order to
make sure my results are not driven by a change in the composition of inﬂux or sorting
patterns of new hires coming from outside Germany but by a redistribution of academics
within Germany23.
As a ﬁrst check for changes in assortativeness, I look at the distribution of the average
productivity of new hires, junior hires, senior hires and leavers over time at departments
of diﬀerent quality. Panels a, b and c of Figure 5.5.2 show the kernel density plots of the
average productivity of new hires in the year before the reform came into eﬀect (2004) and
the year after (2006), for departments in, respectively, the top quartile, the second quartile
from the top (the third quartile), and the bottom two quartiles of my departmental quality
variable - the mean average productivity of aﬃliates of departments. The mean average
productivity of aﬃliates of departments at the 75th percentile is just larger than the mean
average productivity of aﬃliates averaged over all departments in Germany. I restrict the
sample to the year before and after the reform to abstract from changes in eﬀort due to the
reform. There is a clear rightward shift of the distribution from pre- to post-reform for the
top quartile departments, while there is a slight shift to the left (if any) for departments
in the third quartile and no clear shift in the bottom two quartiles. This shows that high
rank departments can attract better candidates post-reform.
A similar pattern can be seen for junior and senior hires in Panels a through c of Figures
5.5.3 and 5.5.4 respectively, with the rightward shift for top quartile departments being
clearest for junior hires. The leftward shift of the distribution for lower quality departments
is most clear in the bottom two quartiles for senior hires. This shows that lower-rank
universities are less able to attract higher quality academics post-reform.
Panels a, b and c of Figure 5.5.5 show the pre- and post-reform24 kernel density plots of
23Given that I construct academics' publication records using the set of publications recorded in ISI as
having at least one author with a German aﬃliation, I do not have a meaningful measure of the
average productivity of new hires coming from outside Germany in the current data set. I am working
on constructing representative publication records for new hires coming from outside Germany in order
to analyse their average productivity and sorting patterns in to German departments in the future.
24The sample is not restricted to the year before and after the reform only for these plots, since eﬀort
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the average productivity of leavers for departments, respectively. There is a clear leftward
shift for high rank departments, suggesting lower quality academics (are made to) leave
higher rank departments post-reform. For departments in the second highest quartile
and bottom half both the mass at 0 as well as at higher average productivities increases
post-reform, so very low quality academics (are made to) leave mid-rank departments,
while these departments also lose higher quality academics post-reform. Taken together,
these patterns are consistent with a redistribution of higher quality academics from lower
rank departments to higher rank departments and of lower quality academics from high
rank departments to low rank departments or outside academia - in other words, positive
assortative matching increases post-reform.
5.4.2 Regression analysis
To formally test whether positive assortative matching increases post-reform, I estimate
the following random eﬀects panel data model25 for department j in ﬁeld f and year t:
y¯
{k}
j,f,t = β0 + β1y¯
old
j + β2t+ β3post+ β4post  y¯oldj + cf + ujt (5.4.1)
The dependent variable y¯{k}j,f,t is the average productivity of {k} in department j in ﬁeld
f and year t, where {k} denotes new hires, junior hires, senior hires or leavers. The main
explanatory variable is y¯oldj ; the average productivity of the aﬃliates of department j in
the pre-sample years 1999/2000, which I use as a measure of department quality. The
variable post is zero before the reform (t<2005) and one thereafter and post  y¯oldj is the
interaction of this variable with department quality. The cf are ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects26.
From the theoretical framework we have that higher quality departments are able to
attract better academics on average, so the coeﬃcient on the department quality variable
should be positive for regressions with average productivity of new hires, junior hires or
senior hires as dependent variable. At the same time, an academic leaving a higher quality
department is on average a better academic than one leaving a lower quality department,
changes due to the reform would actually go against the pattern expected for leavers if there is an
increase in positive assortative matching.
25I estimate a random eﬀects model so that I can estimate the coeﬃcient of departmental quality and use
this as a benchmark to compare the interaction of post and departmental quality to. The results are
robust to estimating the model as a ﬁxed eﬀects model, as can be seen in Table 5.7
26The ﬁelds distinguished here are the 12 ﬁelds along the lines of which I deﬁne departments, as explained
in the data description section.
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so we would expect the coeﬃcient of department quality to be positive in regressions with
average productivity of leavers as dependent variable too. Moreover, if the introduction of
performance pay increases positive assortative matching, the diﬀerence in the productivity
of new hires between high quality and low quality departments should be larger post-reform
and the interaction of post and department quality should be positive too in regressions
with average productivity of new hires, junior hires or senior hires as dependent variable.
In contrast, we would expect the interaction of post and department quality to be negative
in a regression with average productivity of leavers as dependent variable if lower quality
academics (are made to) leave higher quality departments after the reform.
I restrict the sample used for the regressions to the years 2001 through 2006 for all
analyses reported below. This is the period spanning the year before the announcement of
the reform to the ﬁrst year after its implementation. I do so to abstract from changes in
eﬀort due to the reform27 and to minimise any bias introduced by reforms and other events
taking place around the same time as the reform28. I estimate the speciﬁcation both with
and without a linear time trend t and cluster the standard errors by department.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5.2. Throughout the chapter I
organise regression results tables in the following way: in columns 1a and 1b the dependent
variable is the average productivity of all new hires of department j in year t, in columns
2a and 2b the average productivity of junior hires, in columns 3a and 3b the average
productivity of senior hires and in columns 4a and 4b the average productivity of leavers
is the dependent variable. For each pair of columns, the column labelled 'a' shows the
estimation results of the speciﬁcation without a linear time trend, while a linear time
trend is added in column b.
As expected, the coeﬃcient on department quality is positive and signiﬁcant in all regres-
27Restricting the sample to include only the reform year and the year thereafter shuts down the eﬀort
channel, since the average productivity variables are deﬁned as the average of the weighted number of
publications of an academic over the years t-6 to t-1, so in 2006 I only take publications up until 2005
into account for an academic's productivity measure. It is unlikely that any eﬀort changes in the reform
year 2005 immediately aﬀect an academic's publication record in the same year due to e.g. publication
lag, but eﬀort changes might start to aﬀect publication records in later years.
28The most notable of these is the Excellence Initiative; an initiative to boost German research and
science through awarding large amounts of funding for projects in either of three categories; research
clusters, graduate schools and institutional strategies for top-level research. The ﬁrst call for proposals
for the initiative was given out in 2005, and decided in October 2006, the second round was given out
in 2006 and decided in October 2007 (DFG 2014). If, as is likely, higher rank departments are more
likely to be awarded funding through the Excellence Initiative, this in itself might make these high rank
departments more attractive to high quality academics. This would give rise to a positive coeﬃcient
of the rank of a department even if the pay reform does not increase positive assortative matching. I
therefore restrict my sample period to end at 2006, so as to prevent this omitted variable bias as much
as possible.
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sions, so even before the reform academics matched assortatively by productivity. Column
1b shows that if the pre-sample mean of the average number of weighted publications in
the previous 6 years of a department's aﬃliates is higher by 1, the department can hire
an academic whose average number of weighted publications in the previous 6 years was
0.33 higher. This number is a bit lower for junior hires, it is higher for senior hires and
even higher for leavers. The fact that the coeﬃcient of department quality is highest in
the leavers regressions - even higher than in the senior hires regressions - might be because
the very best academics leave Germany to start working at top universities abroad, most
notably in the U.S.
The coeﬃcients of the interaction of the post variable with department quality show that
positive assortative matching by productivity increases after the reform. In the regressions
with average productivity of new hires and junior hires the interaction of post with de-
partment quality is positive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of this interaction is large: it
is 1.2 times the coeﬃcient of department quality in the new hires regression (column 1b)
and even 1.8 times the coeﬃcient in the junior hires regression (column 2b). This means
that post-reform, the diﬀerence in average productivity of new hires between high qual-
ity and low quality departments more than doubles, suggesting that departments become
more homogenous in terms of average productivity of its aﬃliates and hence that positive
assortative matching increases. This increase in positive assortative matching is driven
by junior hires matching more assortatively, a ﬁnding that is consistent with the model's
predictions if junior hires experience the strongest spillover eﬀects. This would align with
the ﬁndings in Waldinger (2012) and (2010) that spillover eﬀect are largest for early-career
academics 29.
Reassuringly, I observe the opposite pattern in the regressions with the average pro-
ductivity of leavers as dependent variable: the coeﬃcient of the interaction of post with
department quality is negative and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is
again sizable; it's absolute size is 54% of the coeﬃcient of department quality. The fact
that the interaction is negative means that lower quality academics (are made to) leave
higher quality departments post-reform.
Taken together, these results show that positive assortative matching increases signiﬁ-
29Waldinger (2012) and (2010) ﬁnds that there are positive and signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects for PhD's, while
junior hires in this chapter must have ﬁnished a habilitation or equivalent post-doctoral qualiﬁcation
after their PhD and hence are at least six years further in their career.
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cantly post-reform and that the increase is large economically. The linear time trend in the
b columns is never signiﬁcant and including the time trend hardly changes the coeﬃcients
on the interactions of the post variable and department quality, so there is no evidence of
a gradual increase in academic quality over time.
5.4.2.1 Baseline Regression
From the theoretical model we have that if performance pay increases an academic's pay-oﬀ
from academic output, matching is expected to become more positively assortative if there
are positive spillovers between academics, and moreover, the increase in positive assortative
matching is expected to be larger if complementarities are stronger. Hence one way to test
if performance pay increases positive assortative matching is to compare the diﬀerence in
changes in positive assortativeness in ﬁelds with weaker and stronger complementarities,
eﬀectively using the strength of complementarity in a ﬁeld as a measure of treatment
strength. If performance pay increases positive assortative matching, the increase should be
larger in ﬁelds in which complementarities are stronger (i.e. receive a stronger treatment).
I test this in the following triple-diﬀerences baseline regression :
y¯
{k}
j,f,t = β1y¯
old
j + β2Complementarityf + β3Complementarityf  y¯oldj + β4t+ β5post
+β6post  y¯oldj + β7post Complementarityf + β8post Complementarityf  y¯oldj + cf + ujt
(5.4.2)
Here, Complementarityf is the average number of authors on a paper in a ﬁeld (cal-
culated over the pre-sample years 1996-2000), which I use as a proxy for the strength of
complementarities in a ﬁeld. All other variables are as deﬁned above. I use the average
number of authors on a paper in a ﬁeld as a proxy for the strength of complementarities,
since the larger this number, the more prevalent is collaboration and the greater the oppor-
tunity for spillovers30. By this measure, complementarities vary widely across ﬁelds. The
average number of coauthors is 3.02 per paper, ranging from 1.02 in the ﬁeld of theology
30Indeed, Azoulay et al. (2010) and Waldinger (2012) ﬁnd positive spillover eﬀects amongst co-authors
while Agrawal et al. (2014) ﬁnd positive spillover eﬀects for co-located colleagues who work on related
subjects.
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to 4.63 in the ﬁeld of medicine and 6.43 in the ﬁeld of physics, mathematics and computer
science.
The estimation results of regression 5.4.2 for new hires, junior hires, senior hires and
leavers form the core results of this chapter and can be found in Table 5.3. Columns 1a
through 3b show that the triple interaction of the post variable with department quality
and ﬁeld complementarity strength is positive and signiﬁcant for all new hires, junior
hires and senior hires. This means that the diﬀerence in average productivity of new
hires between high quality and low quality departments is larger post-reform in ﬁelds in
which complementarities are stronger, so the increase in positive assortativeness after the
reform is larger in high complementarity ﬁelds. As explained above this is consistent with
performance pay increasing positive assortativeness. Academics in high complementarity
ﬁelds face stronger incentives to match positive assortatively and if pay for performance
increases the pay-oﬀ from academic output, the incentive to match positive assortatively
increases more in high complementarity ﬁelds, so we should see a larger increase in positive
assortative matching in those ﬁelds when performance pay is introduced. The positive
and signiﬁcant triple interaction of the post variable with department quality and ﬁeld
complementarity strength is evidence of this.
The interaction of departmental quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength is positive
and signiﬁcant for all new hires and junior hires too (cf. columns 1a through 2b). This
means that the diﬀerence between the average productivity of new hires between high
quality and low quality departments is larger in high complementarity ﬁelds even before
the reform, so matching is more positive assortative in ﬁelds with a larger complementarity
measure. This is reassuring, since if there are larger spillovers in ﬁelds for which my measure
of ﬁeld complementarity strength is larger we should see that matching is more positive
assortative in those ﬁelds. The eﬀect is driven by junior hires matching more positive
assortatively in high complementarity ﬁelds, a ﬁnding that is consistent with junior hires
experiencing stronger spillover eﬀects and that aligns with ﬁndings in Waldinger (2012)
and (2010) that spillover eﬀects are largest for early-career academics.
Finally, the positive and signiﬁcant interaction of post and ﬁeld complementarity strength
in Columns 4a and 4b shows that the diﬀerence in average productivity of leavers between
ﬁelds with high and low complementarity is larger after the reform, so more productive
academics change aﬃliation in high complementarity ﬁelds. This too is consistent with per-
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formance pay increasing positive assortativeness, since academics in high complementarity
ﬁelds stand to gain most from matching more positive assortatively and so higher produc-
tivity academics in these ﬁelds are more likely to move to a high(er) quality department
when performance pay increases pay-oﬀ from academic output.
5.4.2.2 Alternative Explanations
In the previous sections I have shown that matching becomes more positive assortative
after the reform and, moreover, that the increase in positive assortative matching is larger
in ﬁelds in which complementarities are stronger. This is consistent with performance pay
increasing positive assortativeness. In this section I want to rule out alternative explana-
tions that might have caused assortative matching to increase and, speciﬁcally, more so in
high complementarity ﬁelds.
5.4.2.3 Pre-existing Trends
First, I test for pre-existing trends. I do so by adding a placebo-post dummy for the
year before the reform was implemented (2004) and interactions with this dummy to the
baseline speciﬁcation in the following way:
y¯
{k}
j,f,t = β1y¯
old
j +β2Complementarityf+β3Complementarityf y¯oldj +β4t+β5post′04+β6post
+β7post
′04y¯oldj +β8posty¯oldj +β9post′04Complementarityf+β10postComplementarityf
+β11post
′04Complementarityf y¯oldj +β12postComplementarityf y¯oldj +cf +ujt (5.4.3)
The variable post′04 indicates a placebo dummy that is 0 for the years before 2004 and 1
otherwise. All other variables and speciﬁcations are as in the baseline regression (equation
5.4.2). If there are pre-existing trends towards a greater increase in positive assortative
matching in high complementarity ﬁelds even before the introduction of performance pay,
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due to e.g. anticipation of the reform31, the placebo-post dummy triple interaction with
department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength should be positive and signiﬁcant
and the triple interaction of the post variable32 with department quality and ﬁeld comple-
mentarity strength smaller.
Table 5.4 shows the estimation results of the speciﬁcation in 5.4.3. In the all new
hires and junior hires regressions the triple interaction of the post′05 variable with the
department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength remains positive and signiﬁcant
and the coeﬃcient is of similar size as in the baseline regression (Table 5.3), especially for
junior hires. Moreover, the coeﬃcients of the placebo-post dummy triple interaction are
not signiﬁcant in any of these regressions, and smaller than those of the triple interaction
of post′05 with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength. Hence there is no
evidence of a pre-existing trend for all new hires and junior hires.
The results for senior hires are not robust to controlling for pre-trends: the triple inter-
action of post′05 with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength in the senior
hires regression is no longer signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient is smaller than in the baseline
regression and of similar size as that of the placebo-post dummy triple interaction. In
the leavers regression, the interaction of post′05 with ﬁeld complementarity strength loses
signiﬁcance, though the size of the coeﬃcient increases compared to the baseline and the
coeﬃcient of the placebo-post dummy triple interaction has the opposite sign.
I also estimate an extended speciﬁcation that includes a full set of placebo-post dummies
:
y¯
{k}
j,f,t = β1y¯
old
j +β2Complementarityf+β3Complementarityf y¯oldj +β4t+β5post′0{l}+β6post
+β7post
′0{l}y¯oldj +β8posty¯oldj +β9post′0{l}Complementarityf+β10postComplementarityf
31Note that other events that would cause such a pre-existing trend would have to be very particular, e.g.
an (relatively larger) increase in research funding for high quality departments in high complementarity
ﬁelds.
32Labelled post′05 in Table 5.4 for extra clarity.
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+β11post
′0{l}Complementarityf y¯oldj +β12postComplementarityf y¯oldj +cf+ujt, l ∈ [2, 3, 4]
(5.4.4)
Here post′0{l} indicates placebo dummies that are 0 for the years before 2002, 2003 and
2004, respectively, and 1 otherwise. All other variables and speciﬁcations are as before.
The estimation results of this speciﬁcation are presented in Table 5.5 and the coeﬃcient
estimates and 90% conﬁdence intervals of the triple interactions are depicted graphically
in Figure 5.5.6 for the new hires regression (Panel a) and junior hires regression (Panel b)
respectively. The results of these regressions are very similar to the pre-trend regressions
reported in Table 5.4; the triple interactions of post′05 with department quality and ﬁeld
complementarity strength remain positive and signiﬁcant for all new hires and junior hires
and the coeﬃcients have similar sizes as in the baseline regression (Table 5.3), especially
junior hires. Moreover, none of the placebo-post dummy triple interactions are consistently
positive and signiﬁcant in these regressions, and the coeﬃcients are generally smaller or
even have the opposite sign than those of the triple interaction of post with department
quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength. Hence I do not ﬁnd evidence of a pre-existing
trend that can explain the larger increase in positive assortative matching in ﬁelds with
stronger complementarities. It is the robust larger increase in positive assortative matching
by junior hires in ﬁelds with stronger complementarities that drives the diﬀerential increase
in positive assortativeness.
5.4.2.4 Hiring Budget
The above results do not provide suﬃcient evidence to prove that the introduction of perfor-
mance pay causes the increase in positive assortative matching. An alternative explanation
for the increase in positive assortative matching could be that higher rank departments
in ﬁelds with stronger complementarities have a greater hiring budget and therefore can
'aﬀord' better new hires. Before the reform, German universities did not have autonomy
regarding the salary oﬀered to a candidate since any professor was paid according to his
age33 Post-reform however, universities can oﬀer bonuses to attract academics or prevent
33Before the reform C4-Professors could be awarded pay supplements in special cases. However, this
concerned only few professors and was the responsibility of the respective state's ministry (Handel
2005). See also footnote 1 in the previous chapter.
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aﬃliates from moving to another university34. A diﬀerence in hiring budget can therefore
make a real diﬀerence in the quality of new hires a university can attract post-reform.
In order to distinguish between better departments in high complementarity ﬁelds simply
'buying' better new hires post-reform and positive assortative matching increasing more in
high complementarity ﬁelds due to the introduction of performance pay, I control for the
hiring budget of a department in the following series of regressions.
I do not observe a department's hiring budget. Moreover, the actual, instantaneous
hiring budget of a department would likely not be a very good control for the budget in
a regression of new hire quality because of omitted variable bias concerns; for instance
if management actively attempts to increase quality by both forcing more lower quality
academics out and using the budget thus freed up to hire better academics. I therefore
use the number of academics who retire from a university as a proxy for its hiring budget.
This measure is historically determined, allaying endogeneity concerns, and is a source of
variation of the hiring budget as I will argue next.
As discussed, the academic pay reform in Germany includes a requirement that the
average professorial pay at the federal ("Bund") and state ("Land") level remain at the
respective levels before the reform (BMBF 2002). Both the personnel budget and the
number of professors a university can employ is determined by the ministry of education
of the respective state (in the Stellenplan) and this does not vary much from year to
year (Kaiser et al. 2002, Jongbloed 2009). Combined with the fact that under the old,
age-related pay system academics close to retirement earn the highest salary, this means
that a university from which many academics retire in a given year has a larger hiring
budget.
German law stipulates that academics retire at the age of 65 (Mohr 2007, Bundes-
beamtengesetz 1985). Because a professor who is about to retire will turn 65 in the course
of a year and because positions are likely not immediately vacated, let alone ﬁlled, I will
use the number of tenured professors that turn 66 in a given year as a proxy for the hiring
budget of a given university (Pritchard 2006). Given that the age of retirement is man-
dated by law, the number of academics who retire from a department in a given year is
historically determined and should not be correlated with contemporaneous factors35.
34See Handel (2005) for a comprehensive overview of the degrees of autonomy of higher education institutes
due to the reform in the diﬀerent German states
35The retirement year can be extended beyond the 65th year upon the request of the academic and if this is
in the interest of the university. Such an extension can be granted for a limited time only of up to a year
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The hiring budget variable I use here is the total number of academics retiring from a
university, not the speciﬁc department. Since the late nineties, more and more German
states have introduced more lump sum budgets (Globalhaushalte) that give universities
a greater ﬂexibility to allocate funds and positions across departments and institutions as
well as over time (Vossensteyn and Jongbloed 1998, Kaiser et al. 2002, "Personalmittelbud-
getierung, Empfehlungen zu ihrer Ausgestaltung" 2008). Moreover, in a study of personnel
budgeting at German universities performed by a task force of the German university chan-
cellors, it was found that in all the universities studied, the allocation of performance pay
bonuses is decided at the university level ("Personalmittelbudgetierung, Empfehlungen zu
ihrer Ausgestaltung" 2008). I will therefore use the hiring budget - and in particular the
portion available for performance pay - deﬁned at the university level for the regressions
below. I will however also present estimation results of regressions with hiring budget
deﬁned at department level36 as a robustness check later on.
The regressions in which I control for hiring budget have the following speciﬁcation:
y¯
{k}
j,f,t = β1y¯
old
j +β2Complementarityf +β3Complementarityf  y¯oldj +β4Bj,t+β5t+β6post
+β7posty¯oldj +β8postComplementarityf+β9postComplementarityf y¯oldj +β10postBj,t+cf+ujt
(5.4.5)
The variable Bj,(t,t−1) is the number of professors that retire (turn 66) between t − 1
and t from the university to which department j belongs. As explained above this is my
proxy for the hiring budget of department j in year t. The coeﬃcient on its interaction
with the post variable should be positive in regressions with average productivity of new
hires, junior hires or senior hires if departments that have a larger hiring budget are able to
attract better academics post-reform. All other variables and speciﬁcations are as before37.
every time, with the total not exceeding the 68th year of the academic (Bundesbeamtengesetz 1985).
Such extensions do not seem to occur frequently, and indeed German academics who have reached the
age of 65 but wish to continue working in academia have been known to emigrate, most notably to the
US (Mohr 2007).
36In particular, the number of aﬃliates of a speciﬁc department that turn 66 in a given year
37I also estimated a speciﬁcation in which I additionally control for the total number of academics retiring
from all German universities in year t. I use this variable as a proxy for the number of vacancies in
the German university system in a given year and include it to control for tightness of the academic
job market. In a year in which many academics retire, there are likely more job openings and hence a
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The estimation results of this speciﬁcation are reported in Table 5.6. Firstly, note that
the triple interactions of post with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength
in the regressions for all new hires, senior hires and junior hires remain positive and signiﬁ-
cant after controlling for hiring budget (cf. columns 1a through 3b). Moreover, comparing
the results from the baseline regressions in Table 5.3 with the results in Table 5.6 shows that
adding hiring budget as a control barely changes the coeﬃcients of the triple interactions
of post with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength. If higher rank depart-
ments in high complementarity ﬁelds would have a larger hiring budget post-reform, and
if this would drive the diﬀerential increase in positive assortative matching in ﬁelds with
diﬀerent complementarity strength evidenced by the baseline regressions, the coeﬃcient on
the triple interactions of post with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength
should decrease when controlling for hiring budget (the formerly omitted variable), but I
do not ﬁnd evidence of this.
Secondly, columns 1a and b show that the interaction of the post variable with hiring
budget is positive and signiﬁcant in the regressions with the average productivity of new
hires as dependent variable. The size of the coeﬃcient means that if, ceteris paribus,
one more academic retires from a university after the reform, its departments can attract
an academic with 0.10 more weighted publications on average. This coeﬃcient is small
compared to that of the triple interaction of the post variable with department quality
and ﬁeld complementarity strength; it is only 25% of the size of the latter. The positive
eﬀect of hiring budget on new hire quality after the reform is driven by departments
with larger hiring budgets being able to attract higher average productivity senior hires:
the interaction of the post variable with hiring budget is positive and signiﬁcant in the
senior hires regressions (columns 3a and b) but insigniﬁcant in the junior hires regressions
(columns 2a and b). This discrepancy between the eﬀect of hiring budget on senior and
junior hire quality can be explained by the diﬀerence in (base) wages between the age-
related and the performance pay system.
The base wage in the performance pay system is lower than the wage at all but the
lowest ages in the equivalent age-related pay level (Hochschullehrerbund 2009). Moreover,
any oﬀer accepted after the reform (or renegotiation of a current position) results in an
academic to be paid under the new, performance based pay scheme (Detmer and Preissler
greater demand for new hires. This might force departments to hire academics of lower quality than
they would in a year in which demand is lower. Results are robust to inclusion of this variable.
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2005). It seems reasonable to assume that an academic would not want to take a pay
cut when taking on a new position (cf. Detmer and Preissler 2006)38. An academic who
already has a tenured aﬃliation before the reform will then only consider an oﬀer that at
least matches his current age-related pay through the payment of a large enough attraction
bonus. Thus, academics who already have a tenured aﬃliation under the old pay system
need to be compensated for the lower base wage in the new system. There is no such need
to compensate junior hires since they don't experience a drop in base wage (Detmer and
Preissler 2004, 2006). The ﬁnding that the interaction of the post variable with hiring
budget is not signiﬁcant in the junior hires regressions, but positive and signiﬁcant in the
senior hires regression is consistent with this diﬀerence in the need to compensate for a
drop in base wage between junior and senior hires.
Thirdly, columns 4a and b show that the interaction of the post variable with hiring
budget is also positive and signiﬁcant in the leavers regressions. This suggests that a
greater hiring budget allows departments to prevent medium productivity academics from
leaving by oﬀering a retention bonus, but not top-level academics. In turn, this is consistent
with positive spillover eﬀects. If academic output increases in partner's productivity, a high
productivity academic is more likely to receive oﬀers from higher quality departments than
a medium productivity academic. A high productivity academic then needs to be paid a
larger retention bonus to prevent him from leaving than a lower productivity academic
at a department of the same quality, since the high productivity academic needs to be
compensated for a larger diﬀerence in academic output and corresponding expected future
performance pay than a lower productivity academic. If spillovers are suﬃciently large,
departments might simply not have a large enough hiring budget on average to compensate
high average academics, but their budget might be large enough to compensate and retain
mid-level academics. This would show up as a positive and signiﬁcant interaction of the
post variable with hiring budget, which is what I ﬁnd here39.
38This assumption holds if academics are risk averse or discount future pay. If an academic is risk neutral, as
is currently assumed in the model, he should prefer a higher rank department that oﬀers a lower pay than
his current age-related wage, if working at the higher rank department increases his productivity enough
(through productivity spillovers) that (the present value of) the sum of expected future attraction
bonuses and supplements from third-party awarded funding and the base wage is at least as large as
(the present value of) his age-related wage. If he is risk-averse, (the present value of) the sum of
expected future attraction bonuses and supplements and the base wage have to be larger than (the
present value of) his age-related wage for an academic to change aﬃliation. Similarly, if future pay
(utility) is discounted, the present value of expected future attraction bonuses and supplements plus
base wage have to be larger than the present discounted value of his age-related wage for an academic
to change aﬃliation. In the limit, academics would not accept a cut in current wage.
39Note that supermodularity of the academic output function could also explain why the interaction of the
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5.4.2.5 Robustness Checks
Finally, I do a number of robustness checks, the results of which are reported in Table 5.7. I
only report regressions with the average productivity of all new hires as dependent variable.
The results are similar with average productivity of junior hires, senior hires and leavers as
dependent variable. In the ﬁrst column I estimate the baseline speciﬁcation (equation 5.4.2)
as a ﬁxed eﬀects panel data model40. The estimation results barely change compared to
the baseline regression in Table 5.3, columns 1a and 1b. Importantly, the triple interaction
of the post variable with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength remains
positive and signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient has a similar size as in the baseline regressions
in Table 5.3. This is reassuring, since if competition for personnel funds within a university
or between universities in a state would drive the result, we should see a smaller coeﬃcient
of the triple interaction in the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
Column 2 reports the estimation results of the random eﬀects baseline model with year
ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation controls more ﬂexibly for any changes in average pro-
ductivity of new hires over time than the baseline speciﬁcation with a linear time trend.
The estimation results are however very similar to the baseline results in Table 5.3, and
importantly, the triple interaction is virtually identical.
In column 3a and 3b I show the results for the baseline regression estimated using an
extended, balanced panel, spanning the years 2001 to 2009 (from 4 years before imple-
mentation of the reform to 4 years after). The triple interaction of the post variable with
department quality and ﬁeld complementarity is positive and signiﬁcant here too, though
the size is smaller than in the baseline regression in Table 5.3. This could be explained
by the large funding waves for research and academic education that started at the end
of 2006 and 2007 (the Excellence Initiative). In particular, the initiative awarded large
sums of money for projects in either of three categories; research clusters, graduate schools
and institutional strategies for top-level research (DFG 2014). Through this initiative,
post variable with hiring budget is positive and signiﬁcant for senior hires but not for junior hires. The
(diﬀerential) increase in positive assortative matching is most robust for junior hires, suggesting that
they face the strongest spillovers. If these spillovers do not just take the form of the academic output
function increasing in a colleague's productivity, but also of supermodularity, high productivity junior
candidates would need to be compensated (much) more for not joining a high quality department that
will have them than lower productivity junior candidates. If the cross-derivative is large enough, a
larger hiring budget might simply not be able to compensate high productivity junior candidates for
not joining the highest quality department they can go to, and hence hiring budget would not have
explanatory power in the junior hires regression.
40Given that the unit of observation is department j, the FE model controls for individual department
ﬁxed eﬀects.
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(high quality) departments in all ﬁelds - not just those with strong complementarities -
were awarded sizable funds that they could use to i.a. attract high productivity academics.
This should cause the triple interaction to shrink, which is what we see in columns 3a and
3b.
Lastly, I re-estimate the hiring budget-augmented baseline speciﬁcation (equation 5.4.5)
using a hiring budget variable deﬁned at the departmental level. As mentioned in the
previous section, the hiring budget variable I use above is the total number of academics
retiring from a university, not the speciﬁc department. A diﬀerential inequality in the
distribution of this budget over a university's departments of diﬀerent quality and across
ﬁelds with diﬀerent complementarity strength would bias the coeﬃcient of the triple inter-
action of the post variable with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength. In
particular, if a greater portion of the budget is available to higher rank departments in high
complementarity ﬁelds, this could cause the triple interaction in the baseline regression to
be positive. The regressions in table 5.6 did not show evidence that this was a concern,
because controlling for hiring budget (at the university level) did not aﬀect the size of the
coeﬃcient of the triple interaction. Another way to test whether better departments in
high complementarity ﬁelds having a larger hiring budget causes the diﬀerential increase
in positive assortative matching I ﬁnd in the baseline regressions, is to run the baseline
regression controlling for hiring budget deﬁned at the department level. If I use the number
of academics who retire from a given department in a given year as hiring budget variable,
any deviation from the distribution of the university hiring budget that is proportional to
the number of retirees from departments will be uncorrelated with this alternative hiring
budget variable. If better departments in high complementarity ﬁelds systematically re-
ceive a larger share of the university hiring budget, the departmental hiring budget variable
should not have explanatory power. Columns 4a and 4b show that the departmental hiring
budget variable does have explanatory power post-reform for the quality of all new hires;
the interaction of post with departmental budget is positive and signiﬁcant. This shows
that departments with a larger departmental hiring budget are able to attract better new
hires after the reform, which is consistent with a distribution of a university's hiring budget
across its departments that is proportional to a department's number of retirees in a given
year. Furthermore, comparing the coeﬃcient of the triple interaction of the post variable
with department quality and ﬁeld complementarity strength in Tables 5.3 and 5.7 shows
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that they are very similar to those in the baseline regressions. Hence I do not ﬁnd evidence
that it is better departments that have larger hiring budgets that drives the (diﬀerential)
increase in positive assortative matching.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the eﬀect of performance related pay on matching assortativeness, and
provides empirical evidence consistent with performance pay increasing positive assortative
matching. In order to study the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness,
I use the introduction of performance pay in German academia as a natural experiment
and a data set comprising aﬃliation and productivity data of the universe of German aca-
demics, which I constructed for this research project. The combination of the nationwide
introduction of performance pay in an entire sector, and a data set that encompasses aﬃl-
iation and productivity information on everyone working in that sector allows for studying
the eﬀect of the reform on matching assortativeness, as opposed to for instance sorting into
a particular pay scheme (if the reform had not been nation- and sector-wide).
The chapter presents a simple stochastic one-to-one coalition formation model that
makes precise the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness. In the model,
an academic's utility comprises a systematic component that depends positively on own
and matching partner's productivity, representing positive productivity spillovers, and an
idiosyncratic component that solely depends on matching partner identity. The idiosyn-
cratic component represents personal preferences regarding colleagues and place of work
and constitutes a friction that causes matching to become less positively assortative. If
the academic production function exhibits increasing diﬀerences, this implies a decrease in
total output. The introduction of performance pay then causes matching to become more
positive assortative by productivity. Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger if complementarities
are stronger. This result also implies that, if the academic production function exhibits
increasing diﬀerences in departmental colleagues' productivity so that the maximum total
academic output is unique, performance pay increases the probability that total academic
output is maximised.
I test the hypothesis that performance pay increases positive assortative matching and
that this increase is larger if complementarities are stronger by studying the diﬀerent chan-
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nels through which departmental composition may change: hiring - both junior and senior
- and ﬁring. First, I ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in average productivity of new hires between
high and low quality departments is larger, while the diﬀerence in average productivity
of leavers between high and low quality departments is smaller after the reform. Hence
positive assortative matching increases after the reform. This increase is economically
large. Secondly, I estimate whether this increase is larger in high complementarity ﬁelds
in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework in which the strength of complementarities is ef-
fectively used as treatment intensity. I ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in average productivity of
new hires between high quality and low quality departments is larger post-reform in ﬁelds
in which complementarities are stronger. The increase in positive assortativeness after the
reform is thus larger in high complementarity ﬁelds. This is consistent with performance
pay increasing positive assortativeness. This result is robust to controlling for alternative
explanations such as pre-existing trends and hiring budget, where I use the number of
retirees as a plausibly exogenous proxy for this budget.
The study of the eﬀect of performance related pay on matching assortativeness is rel-
evant for two reasons. If there are positive productivity spillovers and if these are such
that the productivity of highly productive employees increases when they work with highly
productive people and, moreover, if this increase in productivity is larger for highly produc-
tive people, then clustering high productivity individuals together increases total output.
If welfare depends on total output, this would be welfare-improving. Secondly, the dis-
tribution of productive agents (and output) might also directly aﬀect welfare if we care
about providing good education to all people across the country for instance. In this case,
a more concentrated and hence less equal distribution of high productivity agents actu-
ally decreases welfare. This chapter aims to shed some light on the eﬀect of performance
pay on matching assortativeness, and, by showing that matching assortativeness increases,
ﬁnds that incentive scheme reforms may aﬀect welfare in more ways than by increasing
individual output only. Academia is a relevant and interesting setting for this study, since
the organisation of human capital is of primary importance for knowledge creation and
knowledge creation, in turn, is particularly important for innovation and growth.
There is a great number of research trajectories that can be taken next. Firstly, it
would be very interesting to quantify spillover eﬀects in academia and, in particular, de-
termine whether the academic output function is supermodular. Secondly, estimating
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the distributional impact of changes in assortativeness on i.a. educational outcomes and
university-business collaborations (patents) would be important to obtain a more complete
picture of the possible welfare implications of performance pay and changes in assortative-
ness. Finally, it would be worthwhile to focus on other dimensions of academic output and
investigate whether matching becomes more positively assortative by these dimensions as
well and whether any such increase is in fact due to the introduction of performance related
pay. Results might well be diﬀerent for dimensions such as student outcomes, as they are
the product of the eﬀort of multiple academics, making performance pay based on student
outcomes a team-based incentive. Studying the diﬀerences in the eﬀects of performance
pay along these lines might add to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that
cause performance pay to aﬀect assortativeness and, through it, welfare.
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Figure 5.5.1: Percentage New Hires from Outside Germany
The ﬁgure above shows the number of new hires attracted from outside Germany as a percentage of the total number
of new hires in a given year for the years 2001-2006.
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Figure 5.5.2: Average Productivity of New Hires
(a)
(b)
(c)
The above ﬁgures are kernel density plots of the average productivity of new hires in the year before the reform came
into eﬀect (2004) and the year after (2006), for the departments in, respectively, the top quartile, the second quartile
from the top and the lowest two quartiles of the department quality variable. The department quality variable used
is the mean average productivity of aﬃliates of the department. The average productivity of an academic is the
average impact-factor weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1.
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Figure 5.5.3: Average Productivity of Junior Hires
(a)
(b)
(c)
The above ﬁgures are kernel density plots of the average productivity of junior hires in the year before the reform
came into eﬀect 2004) and the year after (2006), for the departments in, respectively, the top quartile, the second
quartile from the top and the lowest two quartiles of the department quality variable. The department quality
variable used is the mean average productivity of aﬃliates of the department. The average productivity of an
academic is the average impact-factor weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1.
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Figure 5.5.4: Average Productivity of Senior Hires
(a)
(b)
(c)
The above ﬁgures are kernel density plots of the average productivity of junior hires in the year before the reform
came into eﬀect 2004) and the year after (2006), for the departments in, respectively, the top quartile, the second
quartile from the top and the lowest two quartiles of the department quality variable. The department quality
variable used is the mean average productivity of aﬃliates of the department. The average productivity of an
academic is the average impact-factor weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1.
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Figure 5.5.5: Average Productivity of Leavers
(a)
(b)
(c)
The above ﬁgures are kernel density plots of the average productivity of academics who leave a department in
the years before the reform came into eﬀect (2001-2004) and the years after (2005-2006), for the departments in,
respectively, the top quartile, the second quartile from the top and the lowest two quartiles of the department quality
variable. The department quality variable used is the mean average productivity of aﬃliates of the department.
The average productivity of an academic is the average impact-factor weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1.
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Figure 5.5.6: Tests for Full Pre-Trend
(a)
(b)
The above ﬁgures depict the coeﬃcient estimates and 90% conﬁdence intervals of the triple interactions of a full
set of post-dummies (post'02, post'03, post'04 and post'05) with departmental quality and ﬁeld complementarity
strength in regressions of average productivity of new hires and junior hires respectively on departmental quality
and ﬁeld complementarity strength, a full set of post-dummies, their interactions with departmental quality and
ﬁeld complementarity strength as well as a full set of triple interactions, a linear time trend and ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects.
The unit of observation is department j. The sample includes all departments of German public universities in the
years 2001 to 2006. The average productivity of an academic is calculated as the average impact-factor weighted
number of publications in t-6 to t-1. Department quality is measured as the pre-sample mean average productivity
of a department's aﬃliates. Complementarity is measured as the average number of authors on a paper in a ﬁeld
(calculated over the pre-sample years 1996-2000). Post'0# is 0 before 200# and 1 thereafter. Standard errors are
robust, clustered by department.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average productivity 5270 2.581 5.045 0 53.957
Average productivity of aﬃliates 5238 2.556 4.982 0 53.957
Average productivity of new hires 2714 3.682 8.678 0 129.315
Average productivity of junior hires 2313 3.668 8.857 0 144.170
Average productivity of senior hires 1357 5.219 14.272 0 243.572
Average productivity of leavers 2011 3.556 12.234 0 211.211
Department Quality 5166 2.223 4.149 0 35.496
Size 6408 22.766 32.076 0 319
Number of aﬃliates 6408 21.596 30.669 0 315
Number of new hires 6408 1.101 1.965 0 29
Number of junior hires 6408 0.783 1.586 0 29
Number of senior hires 6408 0.318 0.733 0 7
Number of leavers 6408 0.636 1.449 0 27
Budget (University Level) 6408 7.279 6.889 0 39
Budget (Department Level) 6408 0.679 1.254 0 12
Total number of retirees 6408 797.167 67.113 711 868
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Table 5.5: Pre-trend Test II
(Dep.Var.: Average Productivity) All new hires Junior hires Senior Hires Leavers
1_a 1_b 2_a 2_b 3_a 3_b 4_a 4_b
Department Quality 0.676 0.676 0.030 0.029 1.889** 1.884** -1.558 -1.573
(0.452) (0.452) (0.454) (0.456) (0.924) (0.925) (1.616) (1.621)
Complementarity (pre-sample, 96-00) 1.626*** 1.627*** 1.471** 1.472** 2.245*** 2.260*** 4.249 4.251
(0.534) (0.534) (0.667) (0.667) (0.831) (0.828) (2.724) (2.723)
Complementarity * Department Quality -0.075 -0.075 0.078 0.078 -0.423** -0.422** 0.437 0.438
(0.104) (0.104) (0.110) (0.110) (0.204) (0.205) (0.373) (0.374)
Linear Time Trend 0.077 -0.140 0.211 1.967*
(0.593) (0.754) (0.945) (1.082)
post '02 0.828 0.751 0.371 0.510 1.419 1.208 -0.220 -2.196
(0.611) (0.880) (0.661) (1.006) (1.533) (1.813) (1.487) (2.000)
Post '03 -0.790 -0.868 -0.914 -0.774 0.746 0.535 0.019 -1.942
(0.579) (0.760) (0.565) (0.849) (1.757) (1.920) (1.315) (1.694)
post '04 0.413 0.335 0.572 0.711 -0.579 -0.791 1.496 -0.471
(0.701) (0.978) (0.490) (0.965) (2.552) (2.837) (1.916) (2.332)
Post '05 0.568 0.451 0.441 0.654 1.426 1.105 -1.680 -4.527**
(0.681) (1.227) (0.664) (1.463) (1.878) (2.467) (1.463) (1.812)
Post '02 * Department Quality -1.118* -1.118* -1.198** -1.198** -0.391 -0.390 2.924* 2.918*
(0.596) (0.596) (0.594) (0.594) (1.191) (1.191) (1.755) (1.756)
Post '03 * Department Quality 0.113 0.113 0.883 0.884 -1.476 -1.478 -0.928 -0.927
(0.617) (0.617) (0.585) (0.585) (1.568) (1.568) (1.591) (1.591)
Post '04 * Department Quality -0.262 -0.262 -0.427 -0.427 0.730 0.731 -0.785 -0.782
(0.507) (0.507) (0.422) (0.422) (1.743) (1.743) (1.577) (1.578)
Post '05 * Department Quality -1.229 -1.232 -1.486 -1.480 -0.899 -0.900 -1.463 -1.492
(0.776) (0.777) (1.014) (1.010) (0.995) (0.995) (1.288) (1.292)
Post '02 * Complementarity -0.466 -0.466 -0.250 -0.251 -0.739 -0.738 -0.457 -0.457
(0.319) (0.319) (0.349) (0.349) (0.745) (0.746) (0.750) (0.750)
Post '03 * Complementarity 0.388 0.388 0.383 0.383 -0.295 -0.296 0.106 0.104
(0.297) (0.297) (0.279) (0.279) (0.921) (0.922) (0.731) (0.732)
Post '04 * Complementarity -0.165 -0.165 -0.254 -0.254 0.179 0.179 -1.139 -1.139
(0.379) (0.380) (0.264) (0.264) (1.399) (1.399) (1.209) (1.210)
Post '05 * Complementarity -0.240 -0.241 -0.042 -0.039 -0.822 -0.821 1.446 1.461
(0.342) (0.341) (0.314) (0.311) (1.082) (1.083) (0.917) (0.916)
Post '02 * Complementarity * Department Quality 0.229* 0.229* 0.209 0.209 0.170 0.170 -0.469 -0.468
(0.130) (0.130) (0.137) (0.137) (0.255) (0.255) (0.396) (0.396)
Post '03 * Complementarity * Department Quality 0.019 0.019 -0.121 -0.121 0.339 0.340 0.180 0.180
(0.145) (0.145) (0.135) (0.135) (0.383) (0.383) (0.349) (0.349)
Post '04 * Complementarity * Department Quality 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 -0.050 -0.050 0.280 0.279
(0.135) (0.135) (0.099) (0.099) (0.484) (0.484) (0.410) (0.411)
Post '05 * Complementarity * Department Quality 0.351* 0.351* 0.436* 0.434* 0.193 0.193 0.067 0.072
(0.186) (0.186) (0.231) (0.230) (0.315) (0.315) (0.337) (0.338)
N 2673 2673 2280 2280 1347 1347 1758 1758
Notes: * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The unit of observation is department j. The
sample includes all departments of German public universities in the years 2001 to 2006. In columns 1a and 1b
the dependent variable is the average productivity of all new hires of department j in year t, in columns 2a and
2b the average productivity of junior hires, in columns 3a and 3b the average productivity of senior hires and in
columns 4a and 4b the average productivity of leavers. These average productivities are calculated as the average
impact-factor weighted number of publications in t-6 to t-1. Department quality is measured as the pre-sample
mean average productivity of a department's aﬃliates. Complementarity is measured as the average number of
authors on a paper in a ﬁeld (calculated over the pre-sample years 1996-2000). Post'0# is 0 before 200# and 1
thereafter. All regressions contain ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are robust, clustered by department.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
Sort i by productivity, so that θi ≥ θi+1. For ease of notation, I will refer to an academic
with his productivity type rank order number, so that θi=1 > θj ,∀j 6= i, θi=m < θj , ∀j 6= i
and k > l iﬀ θk < θl. The unique stable matching µ˜ of the baseline model is then given by:
µ˜ =

µ˜ (1) = 2, µ˜ (3) = 4, .., µ˜ (k + 2) = k + 1, µ˜ (k) = k, .., µ˜ (m) = m if k odd
µ˜ (1) = 2, µ˜ (3) = 4, .., µ˜ (k + 1) = k + 1, µ˜ (k) = k, .., µ˜ (m) = m if k even
(5.5.1)
where:
k =

i : uk|k+1 < u, uk+1|k ≥ u for i even
i : uk|k−1 < u, uk+1|k+2 ≥ u for i odd
(5.5.2)
It is immediate that no blocking pair exists for this matching, but that at least one
blocking pair exists for any other matching. It is also immediate that the matching µ˜
maximises total surplus and that this is a unique maximum if f (θi | θj) exhibits increasing
differences. QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
I ﬁrst show that the matching µ˜ that was stable in the baseline is now not stable with
positive probability. To see this, keep i sorted by productivity, so that θi ≥ θi+1 as in
the baseline case. Deﬁne Dθk(i,j) ≡ f (θk | θi) − f (θk | θj) and Dνk(i,j) = νk,j − νk,i. Then
i and i + t form a blocking pair if αf
(
θi | θµ˜(i)
)
+ νi,µ˜(i) ≤ αf (θi | θi+1) + νi,i+1 and
αf (θi+t | θi) + νi+t,i ≥ αf
(
θi+t | θµ˜(i+t)
)
+ ν
i+t,µ˜(i+t)
. Here, µ˜ (i) = i+ 1 if i is odd, and
µ˜ (i) = i− 1 if i is even. Similarly, µ˜ (i+ t) = i+ t+ 1 if i+ t is odd, and µ˜ (i) = i+ t− 1
if i+ t is even. So we have that µ˜ is not stable if ∃i, i+ t such that:
αDθi(µ˜(i),i+t) ≤ Dνi(i+t,µ˜(i)) (5.5.3)
and
αDθ
i+t(i,µ˜(i+t))
≥ Dν
i+t(µ˜(i+t),i)
(5.5.4)
where t > 1 if i is odd and t > 0 if i is even, and at least one inequality strict. If
assumption 2 holds, these equations can be rewritten as:
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αc2
(
θµ˜(i) − θi+t
) ≤ Dνi(i+t,µ˜(i)) (5.5.5)
and
αc2
(
θi − θµ˜(i+t)
)
≥ Dν
i+t(µ˜(i+t),i)
(5.5.6)
The probability that 5.5.5 holds is given by Pi = Pr
(
αc2
(
θµ˜(i) − θi+t
) ≤ Dνi(i+t,µ˜(i))) =1−
Pr
(
αc2
(
θµ˜(i) − θi+t
))
= 1 − Pr
(
αDθi(µ˜(i),i+t)
)
, while the probability that 5.5.6 holds is
given by Pi+t = Pr
(
αDθ
i+t(i,µ˜(i+t))
≥ Dν
i+t(µ˜(i+t),i)
)
=Pr
(
αDθ
i+t(i,µ˜(i+t))
)
=
Pr
(
αc2
(
θi − µ˜(i+ t)
))
. Here, Pr (.) = Hνjk−νjl (.) is the cdf of νjk − νjl, the diﬀerence
between the noise draws when j is matched with k and when j is matched with l, and
νjk− νjl ∼ h (νjk − νjl). For ease of notation, let x ≡ θµ˜(i)− θi+t and y ≡ θi− θµ˜(i+t). The
probability that i, i+ t is a blocking pair to baseline stable matching µ˜ is then given by:
Pi,i+t = (1−H (αc2x))H (αc2y) (5.5.7)
and the probability that µ˜ is not stable is
P (µ˜ unstable) =
∑
i,i+t
Pi,i+t (5.5.8)
. By assumptions 1 and 2, both terms in 5.5.7 are positive, and hence both 5.5.7 and 5.5.8
are positive. Therefore, the baseline stable matching µ˜ is no longer stable with non-zero
probability.
I next show that the probability that the baseline stable matching µ˜ is not stable is
smaller if complementarities are stronger. Recall that f (. | .) exhibits stronger comple-
mentarities than f˜ (. | .) if
∥∥∥Dθk(i,j)∥∥∥ =‖f (θk | θi)− f (θk | θj)‖>∥∥∥f˜ (θk | θi)− f˜ (θk | θj)∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥D˜θk(i,j)∥∥∥ for i > j. Under assumption 1, this means that f2 = c2 > c˜2 = f˜2. The proba-
bility that µ˜ is not stable is smaller if complementarities are stronger, if ∂P (µ˜ unstable)∂c2 < 0.
We have that
∂Pi,i+t
∂c2
= −h (αc2x)H (αc2y)αx+ (1−H (αc2x))h (αc2y)αy (5.5.9)
Axiom 1: ∀i, i+ t,∃j, j+ t with i < j such that xi,i+t = θµ˜(i)− θi+t = θj − θµ˜(j+t) = yj,j+t
and yi,i+t = θi − θµ˜(i+t) = θµ˜(j) − θj+t = xj,j+t
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For any i, i+ t and j, j + t with i < j and xi,i+t = yj,j+t and yi,i+t = xj,j+t we can write
the probability that i, i+ t or j, j + t is a blocking pair to µ˜ as:
Pi,i+t + Pj,j+t = (1−H (αc2xi,i+t))H (αc2yi,i+t) + (1−H (αc2yi,i+t))H (αc2xi,i+t)
(5.5.10)
The change of this probability with respect to the complementarity constant c2 is then:
∂Pi,i+t
∂c2
+
∂Pj,j+t
∂c2
= h (αc2x)αx [(1−H (αc2y))−H (αc2y)]
+h (αc2y)αy [(1−H (αc2x))−H (αc2x)]
(5.5.11)
By assumption 2, all arguments of h() andH() and are in the support of h() and therefore
h (αc2x) , H (αc2x) > 0, h (αc2y) , H (αc2y) > 0 and H (αc2x) > (1−H (αc2x)) because
x, y > 0 and h() is symmetric around zero. Therefore, the two terms in square brackets in
5.5.11 are negative and hence so is 5.5.11. By Axiom 1 it then follows that
∂
∑
i,i+t Pi,i+t
∂c2
< 0 (5.5.12)
and hence that the probability that µ˜ is not stable is smaller when complementarities
are stronger.
As shown by Gale and Shapley (1962), one-sided matching models without transferable
utility might not have a stable matching. It is straightforward to come up with examples
of noise draws for which there is no stable matching for the academic job market either.
If a stable matching exists and if the maximal positive assortative matching is not stable,
it is immediate that a less than maximal positive assortative matching is stable, since the
maximal positive assortative matching is unique. If no stable matching exists, and under
the blocking dynamics introduced in Roth and Vate (1990) adapted to roommate markets
as in Diamantoudi et al. (2004), it follows from the deﬁnition of the blocking dynamics
and absorbing sets that if no stable matching exists, the absorbing set is not a singleton
(Klaus et al. 2010). Given that the maximal positive assortative matching is unique, the
absorbing set must contain at least one less than maximally positive assortative matching
if no stable matching exists. Through the blocking dynamics such a less than maximally
positive assortative matching is reached with positive probability. QED
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Proof of Proposition 3:
I ﬁrst show that, if α is larger post-reform, so that αpost > αpre, blocking pairs to
the maximal positive assortative matching µ˜ exist with a smaller probability than in the
pre-reform scenario. The proof follows the same reasoning as the proof for the eﬀect
of stronger complementarities on stability of baseline stable matching µ˜ in the proof of
proposition 2 above. The probability that µ˜ is not stable is smaller if α is larger post-
reform; if ∂P (µ˜unstable)∂α < 0. We have that
∂Pi,i+t
∂α
= −h (αc2x)H (αc2y) c2x+ (1−H (αc2x))h (αc2y) c2y (5.5.13)
For any i, i+ t and j, j + t with i < j and xi,i+t = yj,j+t and yi,i+t = xj,j+t we can write
the probability that i, i+ t or j, j + t is a blocking pair to µ˜ as:
Pi,i+t + Pj,j+t = (1−H (αc2xi,i+t))H (αc2yi,i+t) + (1−H (αc2yi,i+t))H (αc2xi,i+t)
(5.5.14)
The change of this probability with respect to the proportionality constant α is then:
∂Pi,i+t
∂α +
∂Pj,j+t
∂α = h (αc2x) c2x [(1−H (αc2y))−H (αc2y)]
+h (αc2y) c2y [(1−H (αc2y))−H (αc2y)]
(5.5.15)
By assumption 2, all arguments of h() and H() are in the support of h() and therefore
h (αc2x) , H (αc2x) ,
h (αc2y) , H (αc2y) > 0 and H (αc2x) > (1−H (αc2x)) because x, y > 0 and h() is sym-
metric around zero. Therefore, the two terms in square brackets in 5.5.15 are negative and
hence so is 5.5.15. By Axiom 1 it then follows that
∂
∑
i,i+t Pi,i+t
∂α
< 0 (5.5.16)
and hence the probability that µ˜ is not stable is smaller when the proportionality constant
α is larger.
In order to show that the decrease in the probability that µ˜ is not stable with respect
to the proportionality constant α is larger if complementarities are stronger, I derive the
cross-derivative of this probability with respect to α and c2 and show that it is negative.
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This cross-derivative is given by:
∂2Pi,i+t
∂α∂c2
= − [xh (αc2x) + αc2x2h′ (αc2x)]H (αc2y)
+
[
xh (αc2y) + αc2y
2h′ (αc2y)
]
(1−H (αc2x))
−2αc2xyh (αc2x)h (αc2y)
(5.5.17)
It is straightforward, though cumbersome, to show that this cross-derivative is negative
for e.g. a uniform distribution of the idiosyncratic noise terms: νij ∼ U [−ν, ν], with
ν = αc2
(
θ¯ − θ).
Secondly, I need to show that any matching µ that was stable pre-reform and that
matches academics with a productivity rank diﬀerence greater than one is less likely to be
stable post-reform. To see this, suppose that pre-reform a matching µˆ was stable in which
i was matched with i + 2, and i + 1 with i + 3 while all other pairings in µˆ were as in µ˜.
A blocking pair i, j with j 6= i+ 2 to the matching µˆ exists if:
αDθi(i+2,j) ≤ Dνi(j,i+2) (5.5.18)
and
αDθj(i,µˆ(j)) ≥ Dνj(µˆ(j),i) (5.5.19)
Suppose j = i + 1, so µˆ(j) = i + 3. We then have that Dθi(i+2,j) = D
θ
i(i+2,i+1) < 0 and
the post-reform constraint on the higher productivity academic of the potential blocking
pair (inequality 5.5.18) is relaxed if αposti > α
pre
i . Hence the probability that i prefers
being matched to µ˜ (i) instead of µˆ(i) is larger post-reform. At the same time, Dθj(i,µˆ(j)) =
Dθi+1(i,i+3) > 0, so that the post-reform constraint on the lower productivity academic
of the potential blocking pair (inequality 5.5.19) is relaxed too, so the probability that j
prefers being matched to µ˜ (j) instead of µˆ(j) is larger post-reform. It is thus more likely
that i, i + 1 is a blocking pair for µˆ post-reform. Coincidentally, if {i, i + 1} is a blocking
pair to µˆ, then {i, i+ 2} is not a blocking pair to µ˜. It can be shown that the same holds
for any j 6= i + 2, and for any non-maximal matching µˆ in which the matching partner
of an academic i in the maximal positive assortative matching µ˜ (i.e.i± 1) is swapped for
the next-closest in rank academic (i± 2) and i's matching partner in µ˜ is matched to the
matching partner in µ˜ of i's matching partner in µˆ (and any iteration of this swap). By
the same reasoning, it follows that the probability that i, i + 1 is a blocking pair for µˆ
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post-reform is larger if complementarities are stronger. QED
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
This thesis studies the eﬀort and selection eﬀect of performance pay in academia, as well as
the eﬀect of performance pay on matching assortativeness. In order to study these eﬀects,
I use the introduction of performance pay in German academia as a natural experiment.
I constructed a new panel data set that encompasses the universe of German academics
and contains information on their aﬃliations and research productivity for the purposes
of this study. This data set spans a 15-year period, from 1999 to 2013, and, importantly,
includes both pre-reform and post-reform years.
I ﬁnd that performance pay can have a signiﬁcant and sizeable positive eﬀect on eﬀort
in academia, estimating a 35% increase in productivity. Because academics are thought to
be intrinsically motivated (McCormack et al. 2014, Besley and Ghatak 2005) and because
extrinsic incentives might crowd out intrinsic motivation (Ariely et al. 2009, Dickinson and
Villeval 2008, Frey and Jegen 2001), this is not a trivial or ex ante obvious ﬁnding.
I also provide evidence of a positive selection eﬀect. I ﬁnd that higher productivity
academics are more likely to select into performance pay, and that this eﬀect is stronger for
younger academics. This result is reassuring, because the extrinsic motivation introduced
by performance pay may crowd out intrinsic motivation with respect to agents' sorting
decision (e.g. Georgellis et al. 2010). If less motivated or lower productivity academics
were attracted to performance pay, performance pay might have an overall negative eﬀect
on academic output, despite the positive eﬀort eﬀect. Fortunately, I ﬁnd evidence of a
positive selection eﬀect, in line with the prediction of Besley and Ghatak (2006).
Furthermore, this thesis provides evidence that performance pay increases positive assor-
tative matching by productivity in academia two- to threefold. If there are increasing dif-
ferences in production in academia, this increase in positive assortative matching increases
total academic output (Legros and Newman 2002). On the other hand, this increased clus-
tering of highly productive academics might imply a less equal distribution of educational
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quality and local knowledge spillovers through university-industry partnerships. It would
therefore be interesting to study how the change in matching assortativeness in academia
aﬀects outcomes in tertiary education. Similarly, it would be interesting to assess to what
extent the increased clustering of highly productive academics aﬀects the distribution of
localised spillovers of academic research and, ultimately, how this aﬀects technological
progress (cf. Griliches 1998).
Given that I ﬁnd both a positive eﬀort eﬀect and a positive selection eﬀect, performance
pay appears to be an eﬀective instrument for increasing academic research output. The
question remains however, how useful this research is for technological progress and growth,
especially in the longer run. The performance pay scheme introduced in Germany links
pay to i.a. weighted publication counts (Detmer and Preissler 2004 and 2005, BMBF
2002). It could be that academics shift attention to research projects that are less risky
(more likely to yield a publication) and shorter-term, so as to increase the number of
publications and assure a more or less steady stream of publications, and thereby increase
the chances of earning performance bonuses. This might imply a move away from basic
towards more applied research and from more unconventional, possibly ground-breaking
research towards more incremental research. To the extent that we need such basic and
groundbreaking research for technological progress, performance pay with explicit, output-
based performance criteria as studied here might, though increasing academic output,
ultimately slow down growth (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Griliches 1958). It would
therefore be interesting to study if and how research output changes under diﬀerent kinds
of performance pay schemes.
Another aspect of performance pay in academia that would be worth exploring is how
it impacts collaboration. Tournament schemes might, for instance, have a very diﬀerent
eﬀect on co-authorship than piece-rate schemes. Under a tournament scheme, academics
might be less willing to collaborate with academics whom they compete with (cf. Harbring
and Irlenbusch 2011 and 2008, Chen 2003) and they might consequently seek co-authors at
diﬀerent universities, in diﬀerent states or even countries, or prefer to co-author with aca-
demics from a diﬀerent cohort or hierarchy level. This could have interesting consequences
for the co-authorship network and, by extension, the diﬀusion of (academic) knowledge.
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